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CHAPTER 2  
 
THE OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR ALCOHOL 
‘Alcohol, the cause of and solution to all 
the world’s problems’ 
 
H.J. Simpson  
Cartoon Character 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
  Throughout history alcohol consumption has generated debate, controversy, and 
a diversity of government responses. Government policy prescriptions have varied 
greatly, and have included: alcohol specific taxes; restrictions on, and prohibition of, the 
sale of alcohol; regulation of product labels; and limits on advertising. That excessive 
alcohol consumption presents society with significant economic costs is undeniable. 
That on health grounds a case can be made for limiting access to alcohol there is no 
doubt. Yet to formulate sound public policy with respect to alcohol, it is necessary to 
know more than these two facts, it is necessary to understand the nature of the demand 
for alcohol.  
 
  Cook and Moore (2000) present an excellent summary of the contribution 
economics has made to understanding the market for alcohol. The only topic in their 
comprehensive review not fully explored is the own-price elasticity of demand for 
alcohol. Cook and Moore’s approach is understandable, as Edwards et al. (1994) 
presents summary information on an extensive number of alcohol elasticity studies. 
 
While Edwards et al. (1994) presents a comprehensive review of alcohol issues 
from a public health point of view, little comment is made on the elasticity estimates 
themselves. In fact, the main conclusion the authors draw with respect to the 
relationship between price and quantity is: “Other things being equal, a population’s 
consumption of alcohol will in lesser or greater but usually significant degree, be 
influenced by price” (Edwards et al. 1994, p. 121). This same point is repeated by Cook 
and Moore (2000, p. 1693): “Estimated elasticities for beer, wine, and spirits differ 
widely over time, place, data set, and estimation method, but one conclusion stands out: 
In almost every case the own-price elasticities are negative.” As there is no reason to   15
believe alcohol is a Giffen good this conclusion tells us little, as it only amounts to 
saying alcohol satisfies the law of demand.  
 
As it is generally possible to make some a priori statements about elasticity 
values, it is somewhat surprising stronger statements regarding expectations for the 
own-price elasticity of alcoholic beverages are not made in either Cook and Moore 
(2000) or Edwards et al. (1994). Fundamentally, the own-price elasticity of a good is 
determined by the number of substitute products. As alcohol is both mind altering and 
addictive, it is reasonable to suggest alcohol has relatively few substitutes. Estimates of 
the own-price elasticity of demand for alcoholic beverages are therefore unlikely to be 
relatively high in absolute value. Although, as the fundamental influence on own-price 
elasticity estimates is the number of substitutes, estimates will vary depending on how 
the good is defined. For example, consider beer. It could reasonably be argued the most 
important substitute products for beer are wine and spirits. As there are relatively few 
substitute products, it is likely the absolute value of the own-price elasticity of beer is 
quite low. Now consider a specific brand of beer, or a specific sub-market category of 
beer, say imported beer. For any given brand of beer, or beer sub-market category, there 
are many substitute products. As such, it is reasonable to expect the absolute value of 
the own-price elasticity of demand for a specific beer brand or sub-market category to 
be relatively high.  
 
To make further statements about the own-price elasticity of alcohol requires the 
known literature to be considered. The approach taken to reviewing the demand for 
alcohol literature is the meta-regression approach. The meta-regression approach to 
analysing known alcohol own-price elasticity information allows a range of stylised 
facts concerning the demand for alcohol to be established. As such, the meta-regression 
results presented in this chapter make a contribution to knowledge regarding the 
demand for alcohol. An improved understanding of the demand for alcohol is important 
for business, health professionals, and government. Armed with knowledge about the 
own-price elasticity of alcohol, business can fine tune pricing policies; health 
professionals can implement effective harm minimisation strategies; and governments 
can set non-distortionary taxes.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces and 
explains the literature, and describes the key differences in estimation approaches. The   16
relative impact of different studies is then considered, and at the end of the section 
summary details are presented for each study. Section 2.3 presents a preliminary 
analysis of the data, and investigates whether consumer demand responses to alcohol 
price changes vary between countries. In Section 2.4 the meta-regression approach is 
developed, and the estimation results are reported and discussed. Section 2.4 concludes 
by providing an alternative, and perhaps more natural, interpretation of the reported 
estimation results. Concluding remarks are then made in Section 2.5. An earlier version 
of the work contained in this chapter is to appear in a forthcoming special edition of the 
British Food Journal. 
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  Studies including estimates of the own-price elasticity of demand for alcoholic 
beverages were identified as follows. Throughout the month of January 2005, searches 
were repeatedly conducted using two online databases. The first of these, EconLit, 
contains details on articles from over 550 international economics journals and collected 
volumes published since 1969. It also contains details on books, dissertations, and 
working papers, and is based on the database produced by the American Economic 
Association. The second online database searched was the EconPapers database. 
EconPapers is part of the Research Papers in Economics project, and while those 
maintaining the EconPapers site collaborate with the American Economic Association 
to ensure leading working papers are included in the EconLit database, there is still 
much material in EconPapers not listed in EconLit. The EconPapers database contains 
details on over three hundred thousand working papers and journal articles.  
 
Only papers including an own-price elasticity estimate for at least one of the 
categories: beer, wine, or spirits were considered. Any study concerned only with the 
demand for alcohol as a group was excluded from the sample. Examining the references 
of the remaining papers revealed several further relevant studies not identified by either 
EconLit or EconPapers. Some studies, such as Edwards et al. (1994), were particularly 
helpful with respect to finding studies not identified by the database searches. 
Unfortunately, and despite extensive efforts, in some cases it has not been possible to 
obtain a copy of a particular study cited by other authors. However, if from the 
secondary literature it has been possible to establish at a minimum: (i) the estimated   17
elasticity values, (ii) the time period of the study, and (iii) the country the estimates 
relate to, the study details have been included in Table 2.1. 
 
  Comprehensive details of the 76 studies reviewed, organised by author, are 
presented in Appendix 2.1. However, a more condensed version of the information 
contained in Appendix 2.1 is presented in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 is organised first by 
country, and then by author. As some studies reported estimates for more than one 
country, there are 106 entries in Table 2.1. From a theoretical point of view, questions 
could be asked about the model design of certain studies. However, the intent with 
meta-regression analysis is to cast the net widely, and collect as much information as 
possible. As such, no study has been excluded from the sample simply on the grounds 
of questionable model specification. Before proceeding to a discussion of Table 2.1, 
some general comments on the literature are helpful. 
 
  The oldest approach to estimating elasticities is the utility-free approach, where 
typically a double-log demand system is estimated. A more recent framework from 
which elasticity estimates can be obtained is the system-wide approach. The two most 
commonly used system-wide models are the Rotterdam model, which as noted in 
Clements and Theil (1987, p. 25) is associated with the work of Barten (1964) and Theil 
(1965); and the AIDS model, which is attributed to Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The 
properties and limitations of both utility free and utility dependant approaches have 
been widely discussed, and so are not repeated here. See Clements and Selvanathan 
(1987, pp. 1-72) for an excellent treatment of the two approaches.  
 
  Many studies, when estimating own-price elasticities, consider multiple model 
specifications. For example, within the system-wide approach it is common for authors 
to report results for the Rotterdam, AIDS, NBR, and CBS specification in the one paper. 
Yet, as shown in Duffy (2001), the variation in the way the models are formulated is 
slight and the estimates obtained are similar. Specifically, in Duffy (2001), four 
different system-wide approaches are considered, and the range of estimates for the 
own-price elasticity are: beer -.10 to -.15, wine -.67 to -.83, and spirits -.68 to -.76. 
Given the similarity of estimates for different system-wide approaches, it is felt 
including the results from each different specification would place undue weight on 
studies reporting multiple estimates. As such, for studies reporting results for different 
system-wide models, only one set of values is reported in Table 2.1. If an author reports   18
a preference for a particular model specification, the results for the author’s preferred 
model are used. Occasionally, a preference is not reported, and in these cases the results 
shown in Table 2.1 represent the arithmetic mean of the different types of system-wide 
estimates. Where the results reported represent the average of different system-wide 
estimates, the term synthetic appears in the Framework column of Table 2.1. Complete 
estimation results for each model specification are however reported in Appendix 2.1. 
 
  Other variations in system-wide estimation approaches have centred around 
testing the importance of advertising. When the significance of advertising is tested, 
typically a model is estimated without advertising variables, and then including 
advertising variables. The advertising effects are also often modelled in several different 
ways. In such cases, if a clear preference for a particular model is expressed by the 
author, the results for the preferred model are shown in Table 2.1. If no clear preference 
is expressed, the results reported in Table 2.1 represent the arithmetic mean of the 
different estimates. It is perhaps worth noting -- and comforting for neo-classical 
economists -- the inclusion of advertising variables has little impact on reported 
elasticity values. See for examples: Duffy (1987; 1995; 2002).  
 
  A final comparison often undertaken in system-wide analysis of the demand for 
alcohol has been to estimate both a static and dynamic model. If one version of the 
model is tested, and rejected, the results for the version not rejected are reported in 
Table 2.1. If no version is explicitly rejected, the results for both models are reported in 
Table 2.1. Whether short-run elasticity estimates for alcoholic beverages should differ 
from long run estimates is an interesting question. Typically we expect long run 
estimates to be more elastic. However, as alcohol is an addictive product, it is necessary 
to proceed with caution. Fortunately, Becker and Murphy (1988) develop a framework 
suitable for considering demand responses where the good in question is addictive. 
Specifically, Becker and Murphy (1988, p. 690) argue: “…rational addicts respond 
more to price in the long run than in the short run…” So, even with an addictive 
substance such as alcohol, short run and long run demand responses are expected to 
vary. As such, when both long-run and short-run own-price elasticity estimates are 
reported, both estimates are shown in Table 2.1. 
 
  All single-equation models are referred to in Table 2.1 as linear models, and as 
noted above, in general, these models are estimated in double-log form. However, if   19
different functional forms have been estimated, the results reported in Table 2.1 are 
either the results for the model specification preferred by the author, or the arithmetic 
mean of the reported results. If substantially different models have been estimated then 
results have been reported for both models.  
 
  On one occasion, Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005), estimates were reported 
for both the double-log approach, and the system-wide approach. Of all studies this is 
perhaps the most interesting to consider in isolation. The study shows, when using the 
double-log approach, own-price elasticity estimates are systematically higher than when 
using the system-wide approach. Complete details are provided in Appendix 2.1, but in 
the study the average own-price elasticity estimates for the system-wide approach were: 
beer -.22, wine -.33, and spirits -.31; while for the single-equation double-log approach 
they were: beer -.42, wine -.43, and spirits -.57. As the two approaches are conceptually 
different, and the estimates also appear to differ substantially, both sets of results are 
reported in Table 2.1. 
 
  A potentially important distinction made in certain studies is between domestic 
and imported beverages. Where this distinction has been made the different results have 
been reported. If the approach taken in a study has been to estimate some form of a 
switching model, the results reported are the results for the period before the change, 
and for the period after the change was complete. The values for the intermediate years 
are not reported. On one occasion the data frequency was three times per year. For 
purposes of analysis this study is treated as if the data frequency was quarterly. The 
issue of whether the setting was conditional or unconditional was also thought 
important, and so this characteristic has been distinguished in Table 2.1. Finally, on 
some occasions, a distinction was made between different types of spirits, say between 
vodka and all other spirits. When this was done the value reported in Table 2.1 is the 
arithmetic mean of the two values. Again it should be noted the complete estimation 
results are shown in Appendix 2.1. 
 
In Table 2.1 estimates are reported for 19 countries, and the most commonly 
studied countries are the U.K. (24 entries) and the U.S. (22 entries). The most common 
outlet for research on the demand for alcoholic beverages, accounting for 24 percent of 
all published studies, was the journal Applied Economics. With five separate   20
publications including estimates for beer, wine, and spirits, the most active author in the 
field to date has been U.K.- based Martin Duffy. 
 
  Another interesting question to ask is which studies, as measured by citations, 
have been the most influential. While using a citation approach does not account for the 
time dimension -- for example Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005) is a comprehensive 
work and will undoubtedly go on to be widely cited, yet to date has minimal citations -- 
it does provide some insights. The use of citations as an index of influence is based on 
the premise “all (published) news is good news.” Accordingly, another qualification to 
citation counts is that they include both favourable and unfavourable cites. There are 
several citation services available, and the chosen service was Google Scholar. The 
search was conducted on 9 June 2005 and yielded the following information. The most 
widely cited paper, with 89 cites, was Hausman et al. (1994). Although clearly a highly 
influential paper, by examining the titles of the papers which cite Hausman et al. (1994), 
it becomes clear the paper’s impact has been in the area of Industrial Organisation, not 
Alcohol Economics. Other widely cited works include: Clements and Johnson (1983) 
21 cites, Jones (1989) 20 cites, Johnson et al. (1992) 17 cites, and Clements et al. (1997) 
17 cites. Perhaps, with the development and refinement of system-wide estimation 
approaches, it was inevitable little attention would be paid to pioneering works in the 
field such as Stone (1945) 3 cites, and Prest (1949) 2 cites. Yet, one could argue it is 
valuable to view modern results within the context of the historical developments in the 
field, and so the loss of these works from the minds of modern economists is in some 
sense a real loss.  
 
As explained above, for some studies multiple elasticity values are reported. So, 
in Table 2.1 there are more estimates than numbered entries. Specifically, in Table 2.1 
there are 139 beer own-price elasticity estimates, 140 wine own-price elasticity 
estimates, and 136 spirit own-price elasticity estimates. A preliminary analysis of the 
information contained in Table 2.1 is presented in Section 2.3.   21
 
TABLE 2.1 
SUMMARY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY INFORMATION 
 Own-Price  Elasticity 
No.  Author(s) and Date  Period  Framework  Demand 
Model   Type  Beer  Wine  Spirits 
I. Australia 
1. 1975-99  DAIDS  C    M  -.82  -.82  - 
 
Chang et al. (2002) 
            
2.  1955-85  Rotterdam  C   F  -.40 -.50 -.91 
 
Clements et al. (1997) 
  Rotterdam  C    H  -.18 -.42 -.77 
3.  1956-77 Working  C  F  -.35  -.37 -1.11 
    Working  C    H  -.12 -.34 -.52 
 
Clements and Selvanathan 
(1987) 
  Working  C    M  -.65 -.42 -.92 
4.  1956-77  Rotterdam  C    H  -.09 -.39 -.41 
 
Clements and Johnson (1983) 
  Rotterdam  U    H  -.36 -.43 -.74 
5.  Miller and Roberts  (1972)  1970-71  Inferred  U    H  - -1.80 - 
6. 1955-77  Linear  (S)  U    H  -.28  -  - 
 
Owen (1979) 
 Linear  (L)  U    H  -.62  -  - 
7. Penm  (1988)  1968-84  Rotterdam  C    H  -.45  -  - 
8.  1955-98  Rotterdam  C    H  -.20 -.43 -.64 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005) 
  Linear  C    H  -.65 -.61 -.68 
9.  1956-99  Rotterdam  C    H  -.16 -.31 -.62 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2004) 
            
10.  Selvanathan  (1991)  1955-85  Rotterdam  C    H  -.15 -.60 -.61 
11.  Taplin and Ryan (1969)  1957-68  Inferred  U    H  -  -3.00  - 
                
II. Canada 
12.  1958-81  Linear  Dom.  U    H  -.37 -.61 -.05 
 
Adrian and Ferguson (1987) 
 
 Linear  Imp.  U    H  -.84  -1.27  -.96 
13. AIDS  Dom.  U    M  -.15  -.76  -1.76 
 
Apr. 1981 
– Aug. 86 
AIDS Imp.  U    M  -  -.55  - 
   AIDS  U.S.  U    M  -  -.97  - 
   AIDS  Dom.  U    H  -.15  -.76  -1.76 
   AIDS  Imp.  U    H  -  -.55  - 
 
Alley et al. (1992)
1 
 
 AIDS  U.S.  U    H  -  -.97  - 
14.  1958-87  DAIDS  Dom.  C    M  -.48 -.51 -.54 
   DAIDS  Imp.  C    M  -1.02  -.70  -.34 
    DAIDS  Dom.  C    H  -.08 -.39 -.51 
 
Andrikopoulos et al. (1997)
2 
 
 DAIDS  Imp.  C    H  -1.00  -.35  -.27 
15.  1955-85  Rotterdam  C   F  -.15 -.60 -.61 
 
Clements et al. (1997) 
 
  Rotterdam  C    H  -.21 -.40 -.47 
16. 1956-83  Linear
3  (S)  U    H  -.28 -.79 -.64 
 
Johnson et al. (1992) 
 
 Linear
3 (L)  U    H  -.21  -1.22  - 
17. 1956-71  Linear  (S)  U    H  -.26  -.68  -1.13 
 
Johnson and Oksanen (1977) 
 
 Linear  (L)  U    H  -.30  -1.73  -1.53 
18.  1955-71  Linear  (S)  U    H  -.22 -.50 -.91 
 
Johnson and Oksanen (1974) 
 
 Linear  (L)  U    H  -.38  -1.60  -1.30 
19. Lau  (1975)  1949-69  Linear  U    H  -.03  -1.65 -1.45 
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TABLE 2.1 (CONTINUED) 
SUMMARY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY INFORMATION 
 Own-Price  Elasticity 
No.  Author(s) and Date  Period  Framework  Demand 
Model   Type  Beer  Wine  Spirits 




  Working  U    H  -.16 -.66 -.66 
21.  1953-99  Rotterdam  C    H  -.22 -.48 -.29 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005)  
  Linear  C    H  -.43 -.60 -.49 
22.  Selvanathan  (1991)  1953-82  Rotterdam  C    H  -.26 -.16 -.01 
                
III. Cyprus 
23.  1970-92  DAIDS  Dom.  C    H  -.35 -.24 -.17 
 
Andrikopoulos and Loizides 
(2000) 
 DAIDS  Imp.  C    H  -1.00  -.56  -.72 
                   
IV. Finland 
24.  1970-83 Rotterdam  C  F  -.61 -1.78  -1.78 
 
Clements et al. (1997) 
  Rotterdam  C  H  -.51 -1.46  -1.46 
25.  Holm (1995)  1965-87  AIDS   C    H  -.51  -.51  -.91 
26.  Holm and Suoniemi (1992)  1962-87  AIDS  C    H  -.30  -2.31  -1.02 
27.  Nyberg  (1967)  1949-62  _________  -  -  -.49 -.83 -.54 
28. Salo  (1990)  1969-86  _________  -    -  -.60  -1.30 -1.00 
29.  1969-85  Rotterdam  C    H  -.24 -.78 -.30 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005)  
  Linear  C  H  -.81  -.39 -1.43 
30.  Selvanathan  (1991)  1969-83  Rotterdam  C    H  -.54 -.86 -.73 
                
V. France 
31. Labys  (1976)  1954-71  Linear  U    H  -  -.06  - 
32.  1971-95  Rotterdam  C    H  -.06 -.05 -.06 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005) 
  Linear  C    H  -.08 -.09 -.14 
                   
VI. Germany 
33. Labys  (1976)  1954-71  Linear  U    H  -  -.38  - 
                   
VII. Ireland 
34.  1960-98 AIDS  C  M  -.68 -1.95 -.68 
   AIDS  U    M  -.77  -1.59  -.75 
 
Eakins and Gallagher (2003) 
  DAIDS  (S)  U    M  -.53 -.80 -.85 
35. Thom  (1984)  1969Q1-80Q4 AIDS  -    -  -.68  -1.60 -1.42 
36.  Walsh and Walsh (1970)  1953-68  Linear  -    -  -.17  -  -.57 
                
VIII. Italy 
37.  Labys  (1976)  1954-71  Linear  U    H  - -1.00 - 
                   
IX. Japan 
38.  1964-02  Rotterdam  C    H  -.12 -.13 -.24 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005)  
  Linear  C    H  -.33 -.06 -.44 
39. Selvanathan  (1991)  1964-83  Rotterdam  C    H  -.25  -  -.68 
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TABLE 2.1 (CONTINUED) 
SUMMARY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY INFORMATION 
 Own-Price  Elasticity 
No.  Author(s) and Date  Period  Framework  Demand 
Model   Type  Beer  Wine  Spirits 
X. Kenya 
40. 1963-85  _________  (S)  -    -  -.33  -  - 
 
Partanen (1991) 
 _________  (L)  -    -  -1.00  -  - 
                   
XI. Netherlands 
41. Eecen  (1985)  1960-83  _________  -    -  -  -.50  - 
                   
XII. New Zealand 
42.  1965-82  Rotterdam  C   F  -.37 -.39 -.64 
 
Clements et al. (1997) 
  Rotterdam  C    H  -.17 -.34 -.57 
43.  Pearce  (1986)  1965-82  Rotterdam  C    M  -.15 -.35 -.32 
44.  1965-82  Rotterdam  C    H  -.18 -.34 -.40 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005) 
  Linear  C    H  -.23 -.78 -.43 
45.  Selvanathan  (1991)  1965-82  Rotterdam  C    H  -.12 -.42 -.52 
46.  Wette et al. (1993)  1983-91  _________  -    -  -1.10  -1.10  -.50 
                
XIII. Norway 
47.  1960-86  Rotterdam  C   F  -.03 -.12 -.12 
 
Clements et al. (1997) 
 
  Rotterdam  C    H  -.02 -.10 -.10 




            
49.  1960-96  Rotterdam  C    H  -.04 -.14 -.09 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005) 
   Linear C    H  -  -.18  -.21 
50.  Selvanathan  (1991)  1960-86  Rotterdam  C    H  -.14 -.07 -.18 
                
XIV. Poland 
51. 1959-85  Linear  U    H  -  -  -.62 
 
Florkowski and McNamara 
(1992) 
            
XV. Portugal 
52. Labys  (1976)  1954-71  Linear  U    H  -  -.68  - 
                   
XVI. Spain 
53. Labys  (1976)  1954-71  Linear  U    H  -  -.37  - 
                   
XVII. Sweden 
54.  Bryding and Rosen (1969)  1920-51  _________  -    -  -1.20  -1.60  -.50 
55.  1967-84 Rotterdam  C  F  -.30  -.99 -2.18 
 
Clements et al. (1997) 
  Rotterdam  C  H  -.28  -.88 -1.94 
56.  Huitfeldt and  Jorner (1972)  1956-68  _________  -    -  -3.00  -.70  -1.20 
57. Malmquist  (1948)  1923-39  _________  -    -  -  -.71  -.37 
58.  1960-99  Rotterdam  C    H  -.45 -.32 -.35 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005)  
  Linear  C    H  -.29 -.76 -.84 
59.  Selvanathan  (1991)  1960-86  Rotterdam  C    H  -.35 -.87 -.22 
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TABLE 2.1 (CONTINUED) 
SUMMARY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY INFORMATION 
 Own-Price  Elasticity 
No.  Author(s) and Date  Period  Framework  Demand 
Model   Type  Beer  Wine  Spirits 
60.  Sundstrom and Ekstrom (1962)  1931-54  _________  -    -  -  -1.60  -.30 
                
XVIII. United Kingdom 
61.  1952-91 AIDS  U  H  -1.27 -.82 -1.31 
 
Blake and Nied (1997) 
 
  AIDS  C  M  -.95  -.93 -1.32 
62.  Baker and McKay (1990)  1970-86  _________  -    -  -.88  -1.37  -.94 
63.  1955-85  Rotterdam  C   F  -.44 -.57 -.72 
 
Clements et al. (1997) 
  Rotterdam  C    H  -.24 -.48 -.60 
64.  1955-75  Working  C   F  -.25 -.52 -.79 
    Working  C    H  -.19 -.23 -.24 
 
Clements and Selvanathan 
(1987) 
  Working  C    M  -.43 -.48 -.74 
65.  1983-92 AIDS  C  M  -.90  -.70 -1.42 
 
Crawford and Tanner (1995) 
1993  AIDS  C  M  -.67 -1.40  -1.18 
66.  1989-92 AIDS  C  M  -.74 -1.85 -.86 
 
Crawford et al. (1999) 
1993-96 AIDS  C  M  -.76 -1.69 -.86 
67.  Duffy (1983)  1963Q1-78Q4 Linear   U    H  -  -.94  -.78 
68.  1963-83  Rotterdam  C    H  -.30 -.77 -.51 
 
Duffy (1987) 
 Rotterdam  U    H  -.36  -1.13  -.85 
69.  Duffy  (1995)  1963Q1-88Q4 Rotterdam  C    H  -.03 -.41 -.83 
70.  Duffy  (2001)  1964Q1-96Q4 AIDS  C    H  -.12 -.67 -.72 
71.  1963Q1-99Q4 AIDS  ECM  C    H  -.38 -.11 -.70 
 
Duffy (2002) 
  AIDS  C    H  -.37 -.22 -.93 
72. 1956-80  Linear    U    H  -  -.49  -.73 
 
Godfrey (1988) 
  Linear    U    H  -1.43 -1.30 -1.90 
73.  Jones  (1989)  1964Q1-83Q4 AIDS  C    H  -.34 -.86 -.87 
74.  McGuinness  (1983)  1956-79  Linear  U    H  -.30 -.17 -.38 
75. Prest  (1949)  1870-38
4 Linear  U    H  -.66  -  -.86 
76. 1963Q1-92Q3 Linear  (S)  ECM U    H  -.21  -.55  -1.52 
 
Salisu and Balasubramanyam 
(1997)  
 Linear  (L)  ECM U    H  -.32  -.66  -1.28 
77.  1955-85  Working  C    H  -.13 -.37 -.32 
 
Selvanathan (1988) 
  Working  U    H  -.20 -.49 -.79 
78.  1955-02  Rotterdam  C    H  -.27 -.35 -.56 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005)  
  Linear  C    H  -.67 -.41 -.80 
79.  Selvanathan  (1991)  1955-85  Rotterdam  C    H  -.13 -.40 -.31 
80. 1950-56  Linear  (S)  U    H  -.53 -  - 
 
Stone and Rowe (1958) 
 Linear  (L)  U    H  -.40 -  - 
81.  Stone  (1951)  1920-38 Linear  U  H  -.69 -1.17 -.57 
82. Stone  (1945)  1929-41  Linear  U    H  -.73  -  -.72 
83.  Walsh  (1982)  1956-75  Linear  U    H  -.20 -.23 -.46 
84.  1920-38 Rotterdam  U  H  -.64 -1.15 -.65 
 
Wong (1988) 
  Rotterdam  C    H  -.25 -.99 -.51 
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TABLE 2.1 (CONTINUED) 
SUMMARY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY INFORMATION 
 Own-Price  Elasticity 
No.  Author(s) and Date  Period  Framework  Demand 
Model   Type  Beer  Wine  Spirits 
IX. United States 
85. 1949-82  Working  C   F  -.22 -.23 -.51 
   Working  C    H  -.09 -.22 -.10 
 
Clements and Selvanathan 
(1987) 
 
  Working  C    M  -.44 -.26 -.71 
86.  Cook and Tauchen (1982)  1962-77  Linear   U    H  -  -  -1.80 
87. 1947-64  ________  (S)  -   -  -.56 -.68 -.25 
 
Comanor and Wilson (1974) 
 ________  (L)  -   -  -1.39  -.84 -.30 
88. 1964-66  Linear  switch  U    M  -  -  -1.35 
 
Gallet (1999) 
1978-92 Linear  switch  U  M  -  -  -.16 
89.  Gallet and List (1998)  1964-73  Linear switch  U    H  -1.72  -  - 
90.  1987-88  Synthetic  C    H  -.23 -.40 -.25 
 
Gao et al. (1995) 
  Synthetic  C    M  -.22 -.32 -.70 
91.  Hausman et al. (1994)  16 years  Linear  C    H  -1.95  -  - 
92.  Hogarty and Elzinga (1972)  1956-59  Linear  U    H  -.90  -  - 
93. 1954-71  Linear  Dom.  U   H  -  -.44 - 
 
Labys (1976) 
1954-71 Linear  Imp.  U   H  -  -1.65 - 
94. 1953-83  Linear  (S)  U    H  -.54  -  - 
 
Lee and Tremblay (1992) 
 Linear  (L)  U    H  -.72  -  - 
95.  Nelson  (1999)  1977Q3-94Q4 Rotterdam  C    H  -.16 -.53 -.13 
96.  1964-90  Synthetic  C    H  -.06 -.17 -.12 
 
Nelson and Moran (1995) 
  Synthetic  C    M  -.44 -.30 -.60 
97.  Nelson (1990)  1980  Linear   U    M  -.46  -2.08  -1.02 
98. Niskanen  (1962)  1934-60
5 Linear  U    H  -.70  -.98  -2.14 
99. Norman  (1975)  1946-70  _________  -   -   -.87 -  - 
100. 1974-78  Linear  U    H  -  -  -.92 
 
Ornstein and Hanssens 
(1985) 
1976-78 Linear  U  H  -.12  -  - 
101.  1949-00  Rotterdam  C    H  -.13 -.27 -.18 
 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005)  
  Linear  C    H  -.29 -.39 -.26 
102.  Selvanathan  (1991)  1949-82  Rotterdam  C    H  -.11 -.05 -.11 
103. Simon  (1966)  1950-61  Experimental  U    M  -  -  -.79 
104. Smith  (1976)  1970  Linear  U    M  -  -  -1.50 
105. 1954-79  Linear  Kalman  U    H  -.71 -1.11  -1.18 
 
Tegene (1990) 
1980-84 Linear  Kalman U  H  -.76 -1.10 -.86 
106. Uri  (1986)  1982  Linear  U    M  -1.07  -.88  -1.21 
Notes: Framework: Imp. refers to an imported beverage, Dom. refers to a domestically produced beverage. Linear refers to single-
equation estimation approaches. Synthetic refers to the average of system-wide estimates. ECM denotes Error Correction 
Mechanism estimate. Kalman refers to the Kalman Filter. (S) denotes short run estimate (L) denotes long run estimate. 
Demand Model: (C) denotes Conditional setting and (U) denotes Unconditional setting. 
Type: (H) denotes Hicksian (Slutsky, Compensated) elasticity, (M) denotes Marshallian (Cournot, Uncompensated) 
elasticity, and (F) denotes Frisch elasticity. 
1 Refers to British Columbia only. 
2 Refers to Ontario only. 
3 Is an average of ECM and Cointegration estimates. 
4 The years 1915-19 inclusive are excluded from the sample.  
5 The years 1942-46 inclusive are excluded from the sample.  
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2.3 THE DEMAND FOR ALCOHOL: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS  
 
A useful starting point for analysing previously reported own-price elasticity 
estimates is to consider the frequency distribution of reported values. Figure 2.1 
provides frequency plots and summary statistics for the own-price elasticity estimates in 
absolute value terms. There is significant variation in reported values, and: beer own-
price elasticity estimates range from -.02 to -3.00, with a mean value of -.46, and 
standard deviation of -.41; wine own-price elasticity estimates range from -.05 to -3.00, 
with a mean value of -.72, and standard deviation of .53; and spirits own-price elasticity 
estimates range from -.01 to -2.18, with a mean value of -.74, and standard deviation of 
.47. Interestingly, despite the relatively large range of values, in absolute value terms: 
93 percent of the beer own-price elasticity estimates are less than one, 79 percent of the 
wine own-price elasticity estimates are less than one, and 78 percent of the spirits own-
price elasticity estimates are less than one. So, in general, it appears the demand for 
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The information contained in Table 2.1 can be summarised in a number of 
meaningful ways. In Table 2.2, the own-price elasticity estimates shown in Table 2.1 
are summarised by: country (Panel A), elasticity type (Panel B), demand model (Panel   27
C), and estimation method (Panel D). While it was always possible to identify the 
country the estimates related to, it was not always possible to determine the type of 
elasticity, whether the estimate was conditional or unconditional, and what the 
estimation method was. As such, the total number of estimates in each panel of Table 
2.2 varies. Panel A contains information on 415 estimates, panels B and C contain 
information on 377 estimates, and panel D contains information on 379 estimates. 
 
From Panel A of Table 2.2 it is apparent the most studied countries are: 
Australia, Canada, U.K., and U.S., followed by a group of moderately studied countries: 
Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden, and then the rest. That Anglophone and Nordic 
countries should be more studied than other countries is interesting. Anglophone 
countries have a shared cultural heritage with respect to restricted trading hours for 
licensed premises. However, over time these countries have progressively liberalised 
drinking laws. Whenever changes to drinking, or licensing laws are proposed, there is 
considerable interest from politicians and health professionals in the probable demand 
response. As such, in Anglophone countries, at certain points in time there is likely to be 
a relatively high level of interest in alcohol related studies in general, and demand 
analysis in particular. This relatively high level of interest, may at least in part, explain 
the large number of studies for Anglophone countries. Another reason may simply be 
differences in the availability of data. Anglophone countries tend to be beer drinking 
countries (see Appendix 2.2 on the geometry of drinking for further details). As beer 
production is typically a large scale enterprise, high quality data should be relatively 
easy to obtain, if for no other reason than governments’ desire to levy excise taxes.  
 
The high number of own-price elasticity estimates for Nordic countries might be 
explained in a similar way. With long nights and cold winters, the governments of 
Nordic countries have long taken an interest in alcoholism, and restricting the supply of 
alcohol. For example, the Bratt rationing system, where the allocated quantity of alcohol 
depended on marital and social status, operated in Stockholm between 1914 and 1955 
(Edwards et al. 1994, p. 133). Pubic monopolies with respect to the sale of alcohol have 
also been common in Nordic countries. A general interest in the negative effects of 
alcohol, combined with high quality data from state run monopolies, provides a 
reasonable explanation for the high number of studies concerning Nordic countries. 
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TABLE 2.2 
OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY ESTIMATES: SUMMARY DETAILS 
Beer   Wine   Spirits 
 Category 
No. Mean S.D.  No. Mean S.D.  No. Mean S.D. 
A. Country Specific Estimates 
1.  Australia  15  -.37  .23   14  -.75 .75  11  -.72 .20 
2.  Canada  22  -.34  .27   26  -.77 .41  21  -.76 .54 
3.  Cyprus  2 -.68 .46    2 -.40  .23    2 -.45  .39 
4.  Finland  9  -.51  .17  9 -1.14  .63   9 -1.02  .47 
5.  France  2 -.07 .01    3 -.07  .02    2 -.10  .06 
6.  Germany  - -  -    1  -.38  -    - - - 
7. Ireland  5  -.57  .24    4  -1.49 .49   5  -.85  .33 
8.  Italy  - -  -    1  -1.00  -    - - - 
9.  Japan  3 -.23 .11    2 -.10  .05    3 -.45  .22 
10.  Kenya  2  -.67 .47  -  -  -  -  -  - 
11.  Netherlands  - -  -    1  -.50  -    - - - 
12.  New  Zealand  7 -.33 .35    7 -.53  .30    7 -.48  .11 
13.  Norway  4 -.06 .06    5 -.12  .04    6 -.32  .44 
14.  Poland  - -  -    - - -    1  -.62  - 
15.  Portugal  - -  -    1  -.68  -    - - - 
16.  Spain  - -  -    1  -.37  -    - - - 
17.  Sweden  7 -.84  1.01    9 -.94  .42    9 -.88  .74 
18.  U.K.  36  -.48  .33   34  -.73 .44  36  -.82 .36 
19.  U.S.  25  -.59  .51   20  -.65 .53  24  -.71 .58 
  Total  139  -.46  .41   140  -.72  .53  136  -.74  .47 
B. Elasticity Type 
1.  Marshallian  20  -.62  .27   22  -.92 .58  23  -.89 .40 
2.  Frisch  10  -.31  .16   10  -.61 .47  10  -.94 .61 
3.  Hicksian  96  -.38  .35   96  -.65 .51  90  -.68 .48 
  Total  126  -.42  .33   128  -.69  .52  123  -.74  .48 
C. Demand Model 
1.  Conditional  85  -.36  .31   83  -.55 .45  83  -.61 .43 
2.  Unconditional  41  -.53  .37   45  -.95 .56  40 -1.02 .48 
  Total  126  -.42  .33   128  -.69  .52  123  -.74  .48 
D. Estimation Method 
1.  System-wide  87  -.36  .27   89  -.62 .46  85  -.67 .45 
2.  Single-equation  41  -.54  .42   38  -.79 .51  39  -.91 .52 
  Total  128  -.42  .33   127  -.67  .48  124  -.75  .48   29
Now, juxtapose the situation in Nordic and Anglophone countries with that of 
continental Europe. Typically, the countries of continental Europe have had a relaxed 
attitude toward drinking, and relatively liberal drinking laws. If anything these countries 
have seen moderate alcohol consumption as a healthy activity to be encouraged rather 
than restricted. Further, many of these countries are wine drinking countries. As wine 
production in continental Europe typically occurs on a small scale, and at a local level, 
obtaining quality data could be difficult. Combined, these effects provide a plausible 
explanation as to why there are relatively few own-price elasticity estimates for the 
countries of continental Europe. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.2 classifies the estimates by elasticity type. The theoretical 
relationships between different own-price elasticities are well known. And for a given 
study, as beer, wine, and spirits are normal goods, the Marshallian own-price elasticity 
will always be smaller than the corresponding Hicksian elasticity. Similarly, as the 
income elasticity of alcohol as a group is positive, the Frisch own-price elasticity will 
always be less than the corresponding Hicksian elasticity. The relationship between 
Marshallian and Frisch estimates depends on both the individual beverage income 
elasticity, and the group income elasticity for alcohol, and so, is ambiguous. See 
Clements and Theil (1987, pp. 242-244) for further details on the relationship between 
different types of own-price elasticity.  
 
In approximately 91 percent of cases, it was possible to establish whether the 
estimate was a: Marshallian, Frisch, or Hicksian elasticity estimate. Given the 
aggregation in Panel B of Table 2.2 is across different countries, and at different points 
in time, there is no guarantee the theoretical relationships between individual elasticities 
outlined above will hold. It is however pleasing to note for all beverages the mean 
Marshallian own-price elasticity is smaller than the corresponding mean Hicksian own-
price elasticity. As for beer and wine the mean Frisch own-price elasticity estimate is 
(marginally) larger than the mean Hicksian own-price elasticity estimate, the theoretical 
relationships do not hold perfectly at the aggregated level.  
 
Panel C of Table 2.2 classifies the estimates in terms of whether the setting is 
conditional or unconditional, and here there is some overlap with the estimation method 
panel. For, while papers using a system-wide estimation approach often give both a 
conditional and an unconditional estimate, in general, papers using single-equation   30
estimation methods give only unconditional estimates. Using the arguments put forward 
in Clements and Selvanathan (1989, p. 69) the relationship between conditional and 
unconditional estimates can be explained as follows. Consider an increase in the price of 
beer, where real income and the price of other alcoholic beverages are held constant. 
The increase in the relative price of beer causes the consumption of beer to fall. The 
conditional demand equation gives the consumption response where the total 
expenditure on alcohol is held constant. However, the increase in the price of beer has a 
second effect. The increase in the price of beer increases the relative price of alcohol as 
a group, and so in an unconditional setting total alcohol consumption falls. This implies 
a further decrease in the quantity of beer consumed. Unconditional own-price elasticity 
estimates can therefore be expected to be more elastic than conditional estimates. As 
Panel C of Table 2.2 shows, this relationship remains true at the aggregated level. 
 
That single-equation estimates are generally unconditional, while system-wide 
estimation results are often both conditional and unconditional, partly, but not 
completely explains the results shown in Panel D of Table 2.2. As previously 
mentioned, Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005) provides an opportunity to directly 
compare estimates from a system-wide estimation approach with those from a single-
equation double-log approach. The results show the single-equation double-log model 
consistently provides more elastic own-price elasticity estimates. While it is well known 
the double-log model violates the adding up constraint, this hardly appears an 
appropriate explanation for single-equation methods giving more elastic estimates. The 
question of the difference between single-equation estimates and system-wide estimates 
is revisited in Section 2.4.  
 
There are many natural questions which arise when the data is presented as it is 
in Table 2.2. For example, Stigler and Becker (1977, p. 76) argue: “…tastes neither 
change capriciously nor differ importantly between people…” As such, an obvious 
question to investigate is whether demand responses to changes in the price of alcoholic 
beverages are consistent across countries. The answer to this question can be found by 
examining whether for beverage  (1 , 2 , 3 ) ii = , the own-price elasticity estimates are the 
same in all  ( 1,...,19) kk =  countries.  
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If  ik η  is used to denote the mean elasticity estimate of beverage i in country k, 
and  ik S  the associated standard deviation, then a symmetric test of whether the mean 
own-price elasticity estimate for beverage i is the same in country k and j where 
, kj ≠ can be established as: 
22 ,
ik ij







where  ik N  represents the number of elasticity observations for beverage i from country 
k. The degrees of freedom for the test, while often not known, can be estimated using 




42 42 degrees of freedom .
11
ik ik ij ij








  Complete test results are reported in Appendix 2.3, but the key findings are 
shown in Table 2.3, and can be summarised as follows. For beer, it is possible to make 
78 pair-wise comparisons, and in 18 cases it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of 
equal sample means. For both spirits and wine, it is possible to make 66 pair-wise 
comparisons, and it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of equal sample means 33 
times for wine, and 15 times for spirits. The average rejection rates are therefore: beer 
23 percent, wine 50 percent, spirits 23 percent, and all beverages 31 percent. So, on the 
basis of this preliminary analysis, it could be argued there exists considerable similarity 
in the price response of alcohol consumers from different countries with respect to beer 
and spirits. The evidence with respect to wine is however mixed. Interestingly, the 
individual country with the greatest number of rejections was France. For France, all 
beverages had average rejection rates of at least 50 percent, and the average rejection 
rate across all beverages in France was 65 percent. Perhaps, at least with respect to 
alcohol consumption, it is as so many French argue; the French really are different.  
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TABLE 2.3 
REJECTION RATES FOR PAIR-WISE TESTS OF 
EQUAL MEAN ELASTICITY VALUES 
(percent) 
Country   Beer  Wine  Spirits  Average 
Australia   17  36   18    24 
Canada  33  36   9    26 
Cyprus  0  18   0    6 
Finland  33  45   36    38 
France   50  73   73    65 
Ireland   25  82   18    41 
Japan   33  73   9    38 
Kenya   0   -    -    0 
NZ   0  55  36   23 
Norway  50  73   27    50 
Sweden   0  36   9    15 
UK   25  36   27    29 
US   33  36   9    26 
Average   23  50   23    31 
 
2.4 META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
An increasingly popular -- although still controversial -- way of reviewing 
academic literature where there are numerous published studies is the technique of 
meta-regression analysis:  
 
In particular, meta-regression analysis is a form of meta-analysis 
especially designed to investigate empirical research in economics 
… In a meta-regression analysis, the dependent variable is a 
summary statistic, perhaps a regression parameter, drawn from each 
study, while the independent variables may include characteristics 
of the method, design and data used in these studies. Thus meta-
regression analysis can identify the extent to which the particular 
choice of methods, design and data affect reported results. Meta-
regression analysis can help to explain the wide study-to-study 
variation found among research findings and offer specific reasons, 
based on the studies themselves, why the evidence on a certain 
question may appear contradictory or overly varied (Stanley 2001, 
pp. 131-132).    
 
Within the context of reviewing elasticity estimates, the meta-regression approach 
appears particularly appropriate. The process of selecting explanatory variables for this   33
analysis was based around allowing for known theoretical variations between estimates, 
but was also influenced by the availability of details on each study, and the relationships 




ik j jik ik j X u ηβ
= =+ ∑       (2.1) 
In equation (2.1) log ik η  is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the own-price 
elasticity of demand for beverage i  in country k ;  j β  is  the  j
th estimated response 
coefficient; the  jik X  are the factors thought to influence the reported elasticity estimate; 
and  ik u  is a zero mean error term which may or may not have constant variance.  
 
  Specifically, the proposed model includes dummy variables to distinguish 
between: beverage type, elasticity type, model framework, data frequency, response 
time frame, whether the beverage was imported, and country specific effects. 
Continuous variables are also included in the model and allow the impact of publication 
date and sample date to be considered. 
 
  It was also thought mean elasticity estimates for countries may be influenced by 
the level of per capita alcohol consumption in each country. For example, given a CES 
utility function, it can be shown the absolute value of the own-price elasticity of demand 
for commodity i deceases as the budget share of commodity i increases (Selvanathan 
and Clements 1995, p. 42). There may therefore exist a relationship between alcohol 
consumption and estimates of the own-price elasticity of demand. Although budget 
share information was not available, potentially useful alcohol consumption statistics 
were available. 
 
The first alcohol variable considered, and denoted Level, is a measure, in litres, 
of the per capita ethanol consumption associated with beverage i in country k, in 1996. 
It is an attempt to capture the differences between countries with a high level of alcohol 
consumption such as France -- the per capita level of ethanol consumption for France in 
1996 was: beer 2.45 litres, wine 8.91 litres, and spirits 3.01 litres -- and countries with 
generally low alcohol consumption such as Norway -- the level of per capita ethanol 
consumption in Norway in 1996 was: beer 3.27 litres, wine 1.13 litres, and spirits 1.02 
litres. The left-hand panel of Table 2.4 shows per capita ethanol consumption 
information for 19 countries. 
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The second alcohol variable considered, and denoted Ethanol Share, is slightly 
different, and measures the relative importance of beverage i in country k. The most 
satisfactory measure of the relative importance of beer, wine, and spirits in each country 
would be the conditional market shares, where the conditional market share,  , i w  of 
beverage i, is given by () , ii pqM  where  i p  is the price of beverage i,  i q  is the quantity 
of beverage i consumed, M =
3
1 , ii i pq
= ∑  and 
3
1 1 i i w
= = ∑ . Unfortunately it was not 
possible to calculate such a measure for each country, and so an alternative was sought. 
Data on the per capita relative ethanol share of each beverage was available, and this 
data is thought a good proxy for conditional market share information. Per capita 
relative ethanol share information is shown in the right-hand panel of Table 2.4. 
 
TABLE 2.4 
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN 1996 IN TERMS OF PURE ALCOHOL 
Volume (litres)    Share in Total (percent) 
No. Country 
Beer Wine Spirits  Total    Beer  Wine Spirits Total 
1. Australia  6.07 2.78  1.72  10.57   57.43  26.30 16.27 100 
2. Canada  4.23 1.19  2.16  7.58   55.80  15.70 28.50 100 
3. Cyprus  3.40 2.05  4.55  10.00   34.00  20.50 45.50 100 
4. Finland  5.06 1.12  2.40  8.58   58.97  13.05 27.97 100 
5. France  2.45 8.91  3.01  14.37   17.05  62.00 20.95 100 
6. Germany  8.01 3.26  2.50  13.77   58.17  23.67 18.16 100 
7. Ireland  9.32 2.35  2.22  13.89   67.10  16.92 15.98 100 
8. Italy  1.41 7.74  1.06  10.21   13.81  75.81 10.38 100 
9. Japan  3.21 .14  2.62  5.97   53.77 2.35 43.89 100 
10. Kenya  .87  .01  .77  1.65   52.73  .61  46.67  100 
11. Netherlands  5.13 2.51  2.16  9.80   52.35 25.61 22.04  100 
12. New  Zealand  6.11 2.59  1.51  10.21  59.84 25.37 14.79  100 
13. Norway  3.27 1.13  1.02  5.42   60.33 20.85 18.82  100 
14. Poland  2.62 1.06  4.24  7.92   33.08 13.38 53.54  100 
15. Portugal  3.75 8.81  .97  13.53  27.72 65.11  7.17  100 
16. Spain  3.86 4.34  2.86  11.06  34.90 39.24 25.86  100 
17. Sweden  3.64 1.97  1.44  7.05   51.63 27.94 20.43  100 
18. U.K.  6.34 1.94  1.72  10.00  63.40 19.40 17.20  100 
19. U.S.  5.36 1.12  2.43  8.91   60.16 12.57 27.27  100 
 Mean  4.43  2.90 2.18  9.50    48.01  26.65  25.34  100 
Source: Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005).  
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Although the two alcohol consumption measures are correlated, they are not 
quite the same. For example, while Norway is in general a low alcohol consumption 
country, beer, with an ethanol market share of 60 percent, is clearly the most important 
beverage within this market. Similarly, while France is in general a high alcohol 
consumption country, wine, with a ethanol market share of 62 percent, is noticeably 
more important than either spirits or beer.  
 
To avoid perfect multicollinearity when estimating equation (2.1) it is necessary 
to include in the base: one beverage type, one elasticity type, a model setting, an 
estimation method, a data frequency, and a country. The base beverage category is beer, 
the base elasticity type is Marshallian, the base model setting is conditional, the base 
estimation approach is the system-wide approach, the base data frequency is annual, and 
the base country is Australia. For several countries listed in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 
there was only one elasticity observation. These countries and observations are therefore 
not included in the regression analysis. Least squares has been used to estimate equation 
(2.1), and the software used for the actual computations was Microfit for Windows 4.1. 
 
The results shown in column (1) of Table 2.5 relate to the model specification 
including alcohol consumption variables, and variables capturing differences in demand 
models. Individually the alcohol consumption variables Level and Ethanol Share are not 
statistically different from zero, and the evidence with respect to functional form using 
this specification is marginal. However, if the two alcohol consumption variables are 
highly correlated, then lack of precision with respect to the estimates may be the reason 
they are individually not significant. The correlation matrix for all explanatory variables 
was calculated, and the correlation between the two variables was .937. As an additional 
criteria for judging whether multicollinearity between the two variables was 
problematic, Klein’s Rule, reported in Maddala (1992, p. 273) and explained below, 




y R  denote the squared multiple correlation coefficient for equation (2.1). 
Further, let 
2
j R  denote the squared multiple correlation coefficient between explanatory 
variable j, a variable originally on the right-hand side of equation (2.1), and all other 
explanatory variables. If 
22
yj R R <  then, according to Klein’s Rule, multicollinearity is a 
problem. As 
22
jy R R >  when j is equal to the Level variable, and when j is equal to the   36
Ethanol Share variable, multicollinearity between these two variables is thought to be a 
problem. Appendix 2.4 reports complete details on multicollinearity tests, and the 
complete correlation matrix. 
 
  Given the existence of a high level of multicollinearity between the two 
variables, a joint test of significance was conducted. However, as the calculated F-
statistic is 1.009, at conventional levels of significance, it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis the joint effect of the two variables is zero. An interesting question to ask at 
this point concerns the overlap between the information provided by the alcohol 
consumption data variables, and the country dummies. If the meta-regression is 
estimated without country dummies, but including alcohol consumption information -- 
column (2) of Table 2.5 -- the regression fails the functional form test. Further, even 
when the country dummies are excluded, based on an F-test, at the 95 percent 
confidence level, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis the joint effect of including 
alcohol consumption variables is zero. It therefore appears appropriate to exclude 
alcohol consumption information from the model. 
 
Equation (2.1) was therefore re-estimated excluding alcohol consumption 
variables, and the results are shown in column (3) of Table 2.5. The revised 
specification passes both functional form and heteroscedasticity tests, and compared to 
the original specification there is no deterioration in either the 
2, R  or the standard error 
of the regression. For completeness the residuals were also examined. Five observations 
were identified where the residual was more than three standard deviations from the 
mean, and interestingly three of the five observations were for Canada. The effect of 
excluding these five observations was examined as follows. 
 
Time enters the regression as a quadratic, and an analysis of the implied turning 
point for the time trend variables after the five observations were excluded showed that 
the turning point was unchanged. For the remaining estimates -- excluding the intercept 
which has no economic interpretation -- the value of the estimates after the five 
observations were dropped were compared to their original values. Specifically, to 
evaluate the effect of these five observations, for each variable the absolute value of the 
difference between the estimate when the five observations were deleted and the 
original estimate was divided by the associated original standard error and an average 
taken. Formally this measure can be calculated as follows. Let  1 ˆ
j β  denote the original   37
OLS estimate for variable  ( 1,..., ), j jJ =  and  1 ˆ j σ  denote the associated standard error. 
Then, if  2 ˆ
j β  is used to denote the OLS estimate for variable j after the five observations 
have been deleted, a standardised measure of the average variation in the estimates 





jj j J k β βσ
= − ∑  
Using this measure the coefficient with the largest change once the five observations 
were dropped was the dummy variable for Canada. Although even this change was not 
marked, and the estimate varied by approximately one standard error. The average 
absolute variation in coefficient estimates after the five observations were dropped was 
.23 of the standard error of the original estimate. As excluding the five observations 
from the sample did not materially change the estimates, the five observations have not 
been excluded from the sample. The following discussion is based on the values 
reported in column (3) of Table 2.5. 
 
Interpreting the Estimates 
 
The dependant variable in equation (2.1) is the natural logarithm of the absolute 
value of the own-price elasticity, and so the coefficient  j β   of the variable  j X  is 
interpreted as  () log , ik j X η ∂∂  so that ( ) exp 1 100 j β −×  is the percentage change in η  
resulting from a one unit change in  . j X  Consider, for example, the coefficient for wine 
in column (3) of Table 2.5, so that  .5691. j β =  As beer is in the base, this means, on 
average, the absolute value of wine elasticity estimates are exp(.5691) 1 100 77 −× =  
percent higher than those for beer. Similarly, as for spirits,  .6719, j β =  on average, the 
absolute value of spirits elasticity estimates are, exp(.6719) 1 100 96 −× =  percent 
higher than those for beer. 
 
Given the dependant variable is expressed in absolute value terms, the 
theoretical relationship between the different elasticity types are as follows: (i) the 
Marshallian own-price elasticity is greater than the corresponding Hicksian own-price 
elasticity, and (ii) the Frisch own-price elasticity estimate is greater than the 
corresponding Hicksian own-price elasticity estimate.  
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TABLE 2.5 
OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY META-REGRESSION RESULTS 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variable   Est. S.E.  Est. S.E.   Est. S.E. 
Intercept     1227
* (464.3)    1186
* (518.5)    1257
* (463.8) 
Beverage Type                
Wine   .3206  (.2067)    .0847  (.2355)    .5691
* (.0817) 
Spirit   .4441
* (.1879)    .2397 (.2177)    .6719
* (.0813) 
Elasticity Type                
Frisch    -.1055 (.1658)    -.1385 (.1894)    -.1002 (.1657) 
Hicksian   -.5021
* (.1186)   -.5715
* (.1272)  -.4967
* (.1185) 
Model Framework                
Unconditional     .4546
* (.1217)    .4098
* (.1329)    .4527
* (.1217) 
Estimation Approach                
Inferred     .9620
* (.3973)    .9684
* (.4691)    .9293
* (.3960) 
Cross-section    .3021 (.2651)    .0851 (.2920)    .2970 (.2651) 
Linear   .2665
* (.1065)    .2427
** (.1243)   .2644
* (.1064) 
Data Frequency and Time                
Quarterly Data    -.2217
** (.1321)   -.0853  (.1487)  -.2230
** (.1321) 
Daily  Data    -.2170 (.2984)    -.4096 (.3345)    -.2225 (.2984) 
Publication Date    .0014  (.0056)    -.0023  (.0064)    .0014  (.0056) 
Sample Evaluation Date    -1.260
* (.4742)   -1.208




* (.0001)    .0003
* (.0001)    .0003
* (.0001) 
Other Model Variables                
Long Run Estimate    .3508
** (.1903)   .3568  (.2269)  .3551
** (.1903) 
Imported Beverage    .5596
* (.2246)    .4589
** (.2446)   .5748
* (.2241) 
Country Dummies                
Canada   -.3017
** (.1730)   -  -   -.3032
* (.1344) 
Cyprus    -.2754 (.3076)    -  -    -.2884 (.3062) 
Finland   .5760
* (.1895)    -  -    .5712
* (.1750) 
France   -1.850
* (.3042)   -  -   -1.886
* (.2675) 
Ireland    -.0514 (.2937)    -  -    -.0437 (.2706) 
Japan   -.7071
* (.3139)   -  -   -.7317
* (.2555) 
New Zealand    -.3111
* (.1820)   -  -   -.3114
** (.1814) 
Norway   -1.576
* (.2660)   -  -   -1.584
* (.1995) 
Sweden   .2371  (.2336)    -  -    .2298  (.1962) 
United  Kingdom    -.0083 (.1300)    -  -    -.0084 (.1277) 
United States    -.4207
* (.1567)   -  -   -.4224
* (.1435) 
Alcohol Consumption                 
Level   .0045  (.1058)    .0843  (.0625)    -  - 
Ethanol Share    -.0068  (.0123)    -.0194
* (.0088)   -  - 
Summary Information                
2
R , Regression S.E.    .5082 .6322    .2815 .7641   .5082 .6322 
Heteroscedasticity    .0661 [.797]    1.624 [.203]    .1485 [.700] 
Functional  Form    2.701 [.100]    4.776 [.029]    .8644 [.353] 
N,  K   368 29  368 18  368 27 
 
Notes:
 * Significant at the 5 percent level 
** Significant at the 10 percent level. Brackets are P-values. 
Heteroscedasticity Test: Based on the regression of the squared residuals on squared fitted values. 
Functional Form Test: Ramsey’s RESET test using the square of the fitted values. 
N refers to the number of observations, K refers to the number of explanatory variables.   39
For the elasticity type estimates, the base elasticity type is Marshallian. So, 
based on the estimated coefficients shown in column (3) of Table 2.5, the absolute value 
of Frisch elasticity estimates are, on average, 10 percent lower than Marshallian 
elasticity estimates. However, as indicated by the standard error associated with the 
estimated coefficient, the difference is not statistically significant. The absolute value of 
Hicksian estimates are, on average, 39 percent lower than Marshallian estimates, and 
the difference is statistically significant. Whether the difference between the estimated 
Frisch and Hicksian coefficients is statistically significant can be established with 
reference to a Wald test. Based on this test statistic it is possible to say the difference 
between the estimated Frisch and Hicksian coefficients is statistically significant.  
 
The meta-regression results suggest, on average: (i) the absolute value of 
Marshallian own-price elasticity estimates are greater than Hicksian own-price elasticity 
estimates, and the difference is statistically significant; and (ii) the absolute value of 
Frisch own-price elasticity estimates are greater than Hicksian own-price elasticity 
estimates, and the difference is statistically significant. So, unlike the simple 
aggregation of estimates presented in Table 2.1, the meta-regression results reflect 
exactly the known theoretical relationships between own-price elasticities. 
 
The model framework variables allow for distinction to be made between 
conditional and unconditional elasticity estimates. The base model framework is the 
conditional setting, and the estimated coefficient for unconditional estimates indicates 
unconditional estimates are, on average, 57 percent higher, in absolute value terms, than 
conditional estimates. As such, the meta-regression results conform with expectations. 
 
For the estimation approach variables, the system-wide estimation method is in 
the base, and the difference between estimates from linear, single-equation models, and 
system-wide approaches is statistically significant. On average, the absolute value of 
estimates from linear models are approximately 30 percent higher than system-wide 
estimates. The difference between estimates from system-side approaches and inferred 
estimates is also statistically significant. The regression coefficient for models where the 
elasticity estimate is inferred from other data implies the absolute value of elasticity 
estimates from inferred models are, on average, 153 percent higher than system-wide 
estimates. Given the disparity between inferred estimates and all other estimates, it is 
possible this approach to estimating elasticity values is in some way defective. As the   40
most recent publication date for a study where the elasticity values are inferred from 
other available information is 1972, researchers have perhaps already realised this 
approach to obtaining elasticity estimates is not to be relied upon. Although estimates 
from cross-section estimation approaches are not statistically different from system-
wide estimates, it is interesting to note the similarity between the point estimates for 
cross-section model effects, .2970, and linear model effects, .2644. 
 
In the regression analysis three different data frequencies are considered: annual, 
quarterly, and daily; and the base frequency is annual. Although the estimated 
coefficient attached to the daily data variable is not significantly different to that of 
annual data, the point estimate, -.2225, is similar to that associated with estimates from 
models using quarterly data, -.2230. Estimates from studies using quarterly data are on 
average, more inelastic than estimates from studies using annual data, other things 
constant. Specifically, the absolute value of estimates from models using quarterly data 
are on average 20 percent lower than estimates based on annual data. This finding could 
perhaps be explained by arguing when using quarterly data there is less chance for 
consumers to respond to price changes, and so estimates are necessarily more inelastic. 
Such a proposition sits well with the evidence provided by the estimate for the long-run 
dummy variable. 
 
Long run estimates are statistically different from short run estimates, and the 
regression coefficient implies the absolute value of long run estimates are, on average, 
43 percent higher than short run estimates. So, despite the addictive nature of alcoholic 
beverages, it appears the demand for alcohol follows the same pattern as the demand for 
other products. The longer the time period, the more elastic the demand. This may be 
seen as empirical confirmation of the position argued in Becker and Murphy (1988). 
 
Publication date appears an unimportant factor. In meta-regression analysis it is 
sometimes suggested the publication date variable either: (i) captures the effect of 
improvements in estimation technique, or (ii) reflects period specific effects. However, 
as in the current study both estimation technique and sample period are explicitly 
modelled, it is not surprising the publication date is not statistically significant. 
 
Of the studies reviewed, the earliest sample period start date was 1870, and the 
most recent sample end data was 2002. However, as in general the reported results are   41
evaluated at sample means, the earliest evaluation data is 1904, and the latest 1994. The 
story told by the sample evaluation date variables is an interesting one. The variable 
sample evaluation date enters as a quadratic, and the implied turning point is 1953. So 
the analysis suggests between 1904 and 1953 elasticity estimates became increasingly 
inelastic, and then from 1953 to 1994 became increasingly elastic. 
 
This finding has implications for both policy makers and alcoholic beverage 
suppliers. For policy makers, assuming the elasticity of demand for other commodities 
is constant, if the demand for alcohol is becoming more elastic, economic efficiency 
suggests the relative tax burden on alcoholic beverages should be lowered. For firms 
with market power, the optimal product mark-up is inversely related to the product’s 
own-price elasticity. Specifically, the profit maximising conditions imply 
() 1. PM CP η −= −   The trend of increasingly elastic own-price elasticity estimates 
since 1953 indicates falling profit margins and this should be of concern to alcoholic 
beverage suppliers. On the other hand, this trend should be welcomed by drinkers. 
 
It is reasonable to suggest there exist scale and efficiency gains from mergers. 
So, when an industry is faced with falling mark-ups, merger and takeover activity is 
likely. In recent decades national and international mergers between alcoholic beverage 
companies have been common. For example, Tremblay and Tremblay (2005, pp. 187-
201) documents the history of US mergers in the beer industry, and between 1950 and 
2000 the number of independent mass production breweries in the US fell from 350 to 
24. In a sense, it is pleasing the firm behaviour implied by the meta-regression results is 
consistent with observed firm behaviour. Should the trend toward more elastic demand 
for alcoholic beverages continue, the future of inefficient producers does not look 
bright. 
 
Of course, even large corporations cannot expect to escape the pressure of 
falling margins. Should the demand for alcoholic beverages become more elastic, to 
maintain shareholder returns, firms will have to find even greater efficiency gains. 
Foster’s (originally a beer producer) recent addition of Southcorp, the world’s fifth 
largest wine group, to its already substantial wine portfolio, may be just the beginning 
of a new wave of national and international mergers. This new round of mergers may 
however be across beverage category rather than within beverage category, as has 
historically been the case.    42
 
  Before discussing country specific effects, it is worth noting the difference 
between the elasticity estimates of domestic and imported beverages. The results 
suggest the demand for imported alcoholic beverages is, in general, more elastic than 
the demand for domestically produced alcoholic beverages, and the difference is 
statistically significant. Specifically, the estimated coefficient indicates the absolute 
value of the own-price elasticity estimates of imported alcoholic beverages are on 
average 78 percent higher than domestically produced beverages. Such a finding has 
controversial implications as it suggests the optimal commodity tax rate for imported 
alcoholic beverages is lower than the optimal commodity tax rate for domestically 
produced alcoholic beverages.  
 
  The country in the base is Australia, and so the results indicate country specific 
effects different to those of Australia in 7 out of the 11 other countries considered. 
Based on the information in Table 2.5, the demand for alcohol appears to be most 
inelastic in France, and most elastic in Finland. This however is not the complete 
picture. For example, while Table 2.5 indicates the country specific effects of both 
France and Canada are different to Australia, by using a Wald test, it is also possible to 
establish whether the country specific effects of France and Canada are different to each 
other. In total 66 unique pair-wise country comparisons can be made, and the test results 
for these pair-wise comparisons are summarised in Table 2.6.  
 
In Table 2.6 the symbol × denotes a pair-wise country comparison where it is 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of equality between estimated country effects. The 
certainty with which the hypothesis can be rejected is indicated by an asterisk; a single 
asterisk indicates a confidence level of 95 percent, and a double asterisk indicates a 
confidence level of 90 percent. The symbol √ denotes cases for which it is not possible 
to reject the null of equal country specific effects. For each country the percentage of 
rejections is given in the last row. The way to read Table 2.6 can best be explained with 
reference to an example. Consider the case of Japan. By starting with the Japan row and 
reading across to the Japan column, we can see the country specific effect for Japan is 
different to that of: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, and Ireland. Further, by reading 
down the Japan column, we can see the country specific effect for Japan is also different 
to that of: Norway, Sweden, and the UK. So, for Japan, out of 11 pair-wise   43
comparisons, in 8 cases, or 73 percent of the time, it is possible to reject the hypothesis 
of equal country specific effects. 
 
TABLE 2.6 
COMPARISON OF COUNTRY ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
Country  Australia Canada Cyprus Finland France Ireland Japan  NZ  Norway Sweden  UK  US 
Australia  -                   
Canada  * ×   -                
Cyprus  √  √  -              
Finland  * ×  
* ×  
* ×   -            
France  * ×  
* ×  
* ×  
* ×   -           
Ireland  √  √  √  * ×  
* ×   -         
Japan  * ×  
** ×   √  * ×  
* ×  
** ×   -         
NZ  ** ×   √  √  * ×  
* ×   √  √ -        
Norway  * ×  
* ×  
* ×  
* ×  
* ×  
* ×  
* ×  
* ×   -      
Sweden  √  * ×   √  √  √  √  * ×  
* ×  
* ×   -    
UK  √  * ×   √  * ×  
* ×   √  * ×  
** ×  
* ×   √ -   
US  * ×   √  √  * ×  
* ×   √  √  √  * ×  
* ×  
* ×   - 
  Reject  (%)  64  64 27 91 91 36  73  55  100 45  64  55 
 
 
The country with the lowest rate of rejection for the hypothesis of equal own-
price elasticity between countries is Cyprus. However, there are only six elasticity 
observations for Cyprus, and so the country effect for Cyrus is imprecisely estimated. 
This lack of precision, in part, explains the relatively low level of rejections for Cyprus. 
The highest rates of rejection for the hypothesis of equal own-price elasticity between 
countries are for Norway, France, and Finland. 
 
The results highlight an advantage of using the meta-regression approach to 
analyse alcohol own-price elasticity estimates. The simple comparison of mean own-
price elasticity estimates for each country, on balance, indicated support for Stigler and 
Becker’s proposition of homogeneous tastes across countries. The meta-regression 
results on the other hand, which control for model design features, broadly support the 
alternate position. This is an important result, and suggests at least for the alcohol 
market, care should be taken with respect to pooling information across countries. 
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An Alternative Interpretation of the Estimates 
 
Interpreting changes in elasticity values directly, as opposed to the percentage 
change in elasticity values following a one unit change in  j X  is perhaps a more natural 
framework for discussing own-price elasticity estimates. The dependant variable in 
equation (2.1) is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the own-price elasticity 
estimate, and as noted above  ( ) log . jj X η β ∂∂ =  However,  as  () log j X η ∂∂  is 
equivalent to  /, j X η η ∂ ∂  it is possible to write  1. jj X β ηη = ∂∂×  As such, if the  j β  
coefficients shown in column (3) of Table 2.5 are multiplied by 
*, j η  where 
*
j η  is the 
sample mean associated with attribute j, it is possible to arrive at values which can be 
interpreted as changes in elasticity values, i.e.
*. jj j X η βη ∂ ∂=× 
 
Consider first the beverage type estimates. For wine,  .5691, j β =  
* .6974, j η =  
and so  .3969. j X η ∂∂ =  For  spirits,  .6719, j β =  
* .7507, j η =  and  so  .5043. j X η ∂∂ =  
Given beer is in the base, and the mean elasticity estimate for beer is .39, the mean 
elasticity estimate for wine is ( ) .39 .40 .79 , +=   and the mean elasticity estimate for 
spirits is () .39 .50 .90 . +=   The meta-regression results, when interpreted this way, 
provide information which can be used by policy makers to set optimal commodity 
taxes.  
 
For example, if Ramsey taxation principles are used in setting commodity taxes 
then: “In taxing commodities which are rivals for demand, like wine, beer and spirits, or 
complementary like tea and sugar, the rule to be observed is that the taxes should be 
such as to leave unaltered the proportions in which they are consumed” (Ramsey, 1927, 
p. 59). In the simple case of no cross-price effects, such policy requires commodity 
taxes to vary inversely with the absolute value of the commodity’s own-price elasticity; 
the government’s revenue raising requirement determining the proportionality 
coefficient. While it is likely governments also consider the political ramifications of 
tax policy, for beer, wine, and spirits, the Ramsey taxes are proportional to : beer 
1 .39 2.56, =  wine 1 .79 1.27, =  and spirits 1 .90 1.11 = . So, the economically efficient 
tax rates imply beer should be taxed approximately twice as much as wine and spirits. It 
is however worth noting the mean income elasticity values, based on the values reported   45
in Appendix 2.1, are: beer .74, wine 1.29, and spirits 1.24, and so optimal commodity 
taxes for alcohol are regressive. 
 
The remaining coefficients can be interpreted in a similar manner. Other effects 
held constant, the meta-regression coefficients imply Marshallian estimates, in absolute 
value terms are on average .28 greater than Hicksian estimates, and Frisch estimates are 
.22 greater than Hicksian estimates. Again this information is useful for policy makers. 
Economists, in general, are interested in understanding the substitution effect in 
isolation, not the combined income and substitution effect. As approximately 75 percent 
of reported elasticity estimates are Hicksian estimates, this interest is reflected in the 
type of elasticity estimate reported. Policy makers on the other hand are likely to be 
more concerned with the combined income and substitution effect, and so for policy 
makers Marshallian estimates are generally of more interest. Without knowledge of the 
approximate difference between the size of Marshallian and Hicksian estimates, policy 
makers are restricted to considering only the information contained in Marshallian 
estimates. However, if the approximate average size difference between Marshallian 
and Hicksian estimates is known, policy makers can take known Hicksian estimates, 
make a suitable adjustment, and obtain the approximate Marshallian elasticity estimates. 
As only 17 percent of the reported estimates are Marshallian, such a process greatly 
increases the number of elasticity estimates policy makers can consider. 
 
The absolute value of estimates from models where the setting is unconditional 
are on average .38 higher than conditional estimates. Again, knowing the approximate 
size of the difference between conditional and unconditional estimates is useful for 
policy makers. Economists are often interested in examining the effects of price changes 
within a conditional setting. Further, as system-wide estimation approaches are designed 
for the conditional setting, the increasing popularity of these estimation approaches has 
led to applied economic work investigating the demand for alcohol to be increasingly 
framed in a conditional setting. The focus on the conditional setting is reflected in the 
ratio of conditional to unconditional estimates, a ratio which is approximately two to 
one. Knowing the approximate difference in size between conditional and unconditional 
estimates allows policy makers concerned with the effect of price changes in an 
unconditional setting to take unconditional estimates, make a suitable adjustment, and 
obtain an estimate of the approximate unconditional elasticity. 
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Similar adjustments can be made by policy makers for the remaining estimate 
categories, and the approximate effects are as follows. On average the absolute value of 
estimates from linear single-equation models are approximately .20 higher than system-
wide estimates. The regression coefficient for models where the elasticity estimate is 
inferred from other data implies the absolute value of estimates from inferred models 
are on average 1.73 higher than system-wide estimates. The absolute value of estimates 
from models using quarterly data are on average .14 smaller than estimates based on 
annual data. Long run estimates are on average .31 higher in absolute value than short 
run estimates. The demand for imported alcoholic beverages is, in general, more elastic 
than the demand for domestically produced alcoholic beverages, and the implied 
difference in terms of elasticity values is .52.  
 
As noted above, the sample period variable entered as a quadratic, has a turning 
point in 1953, and sample end points of 1904 and 1994. By evaluating the implied 
impact of the sample period variable in 1904, 1953, and 1994, it is possible to obtain 
some idea of the magnitude of the change in elasticity estimates through time. The 
implied values indicate, controlling for other factors, between 1904 and 1953, the 
absolute value of alcoholic beverage own-price elasticity estimates fell by, on average, 




  The nature of the demand for alcohol is an interesting and important topic, and 
one worthy of detailed study. That others have found the demand for alcohol an 
interesting topic is evidenced by the volume of studies reviewed in Appendix 2.1. This 
chapter has contributed to understanding the nature of the demand for alcohol, not by 
presenting a new set of elasticity estimates for alcoholic beverages, but by developing a 
framework though which all previous estimates may be viewed, and in doing so 
allowing the reasons for the disparity in reported results to be understood. 
 
The meta-regression analysis presented above allows stylised facts regarding the 
demand for alcohol to be established. The most important of these facts are perhaps: (i) 
the demand for alcoholic beverages is price inelastic; (ii) the alcoholic beverage with 
the most inelastic demand is beer, and the alcoholic beverage with the most elastic 
demand is spirits; (iii) contrary to the proposition of Stigler and Becker (1977)   47
consumer responses to changes in the price of alcoholic beverages vary with country; 
(iv) model design attributes such as estimation method and data frequency effect 
reported elasticity estimates, and these effects are substantial; and (v) there is an 
underlying trend in own-price elasticity estimates suggesting the demand for alcohol has 
become less inelastic since the 1950s. 
 
  The meta-regression results also provide a framework through which it is 
possible to view different estimates and understand why they differ. The results allow 
policy makers, health professionals, and economists, to take any given set of elasticity 
values, and interpret them within the most appropriate context. For example, a policy 
maker faced with a set of Hicksian own-price elasticity estimates can use the estimated 
meta-regression coefficients to convert the Hicksian estimates to approximate 
Marshallian values. The ability to move between Hicksian and Marshallian estimates, or 
between conditional and unconditional estimates, etc., is valuable.  
 
  A final significant contribution the meta-regression approach makes is to isolate 
individual factors which effect elasticity estimates. For example, since the mid 1950s, 
the general trend in own-price elasticity estimates for alcoholic beverages has been for 
them to become more elastic. However, system-wide estimation approaches give more 
inelastic estimates than single-equation methods, and over time system-wide approaches 
have become increasingly popular. So, to anyone observing only the published elasticity 
estimates, the underlying trend towards increasingly less inelastic own-price elasticity 
estimates in recent decades, would, in part, be masked by the impact of the general 
switch away from single-equation estimation methods to system-wide approaches. By 
isolating the estimation method effect, it becomes possible to observe the true 
underlying trend in elasticity values. As such, the analysis makes possible a much 
deeper and richer understanding of the nature of the demand for alcohol.   48
APPENDIX 2.1 
SUMMARY DETAILS ON ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
 
  The original intent of Table A2.1 was to provide complete details on the 
estimation results reported in each paper. Yet even within the context of an appendix 
this proved impractical. For example, in Clements and Selvanathan (1987), a system-
wide estimation approach is used and estimates are reported for three different types of 
own-price elasticity, across three countries, and for 21 years. For this study there are 
therefore () 3 3 21 189 ×× =  different own-price elasticity estimates. In Godfrey (1988) 
there are two different linear model specifications, and 4 different functional forms, so 
() 2432 4 ××=   different own-price elasticity estimates to consider. In strict cross-
section studies results are often reported for a range of provinces. For example, in 
Simon (1966), an early cross-section study of the US, results are reported for 28 
different states. To bring the reported elasticity information down to a manageable size, 
results have been summarised. As such, some information is lost, however this loss is 
offset by increased ease of comprehension.  
 
In general, for linear single-equation models, when the difference between 
results is simply the result of different functional forms, such as Linear-Linear, Log-Log 
etc., the results reported in Table A2.1 represent the arithmetic mean of the reported 
estimates. On occasion authors express a clear preference for one specification over 
another. In such cases the results reported are those preferred by the authors. When 
substantially different specifications have been estimated, the results for the different 
specifications are reported in Table A2.1. 
 
  In general, for system-wide approaches to estimating elasticities, results are 
reported either for more than one model specification, or for more than one time period. 
The values reported are almost always evaluated at sample means, and if not, the time 
period is stated in the comments section of Table 2.1. When both a static version and a 
dynamic version of the model are estimated, if the author does not explicitly reject one 
model, both results are reported. When different system-wide estimation approaches 
have been used, such as the Rotterdam model or the AIDS model, the results for the 
different approaches are reported. 
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  For cross-section estimation, if pooled results are reported, it is the pooled 
values which are shown in the table. Rather than presenting pooled estimates some 
authors express a preference for taking the median estimate. When the author adopts 
this approach it is the median estimate which is reported in Table A2.1. 
 
  Occasionally models report non-positive income elasticity estimates, or non-
negative own-price elasticities estimates. That alcoholic beverages are either inferior 
goods, or Giffen goods, is inconsistent with accumulated wisdom. As such, all non-
positive income elasticity estimates, and non-negative own-price elasticity estimates are 
ignored. Comment length is to a large extent determined by the space available, and 
does not reflect upon the quality of the paper.  
 
  On occasion it was difficult to determine whether estimates presented were 
compensated or uncompensated own-price elasticities. For system-wide approaches, 
where the author presented complete estimation results, it was often possible to confirm 
which type of estimate was being considered. However on other occasions this kind of 
fact checking was not possible. If it was not possible to check the reported estimates, the 
decision to classify the estimates as compensated or uncompensated was based on what 
seemed appropriate given the discussion presented in the text. 
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TABLE A2.1 
SUMMARY DETAILS OF PAPERS AND ESTIMATES 
 Income  Elasticity  Own-Price  Elasticity  Author(s) and  
Date  Source  Country/ 
Region  Period Framework  Demand 
Model   Beer Wine Spirits Type  Beer Wine Spirits
Comments 






Linear   Imp.  U    1.54  .62  .69  H  -.84  -1.27  -.96 
The data are annual and pooled across province. Individual 
province estimates are also presented. A dynamic version of 
the model is estimated and rejected. 
                         







– Aug. 86 
AIDS Imp.  U    -  .29  -  M  -  -.55  - 
       AIDS  U.S.  U    -  .11 -  M -  -.97 - 
       AIDS  Dom.  U    -  -  -  H -.15  -.76  -1.76 
       AIDS  Imp.  U    -  -  -  H -  -.55  - 
       AIDS  U.S.  U    -  -  -  H -  -.97 - 
Data are monthly. Homogeneity and symmetry are imposed. 
Within equation tests support homogeneity, joint tests reject 
homogeneity and symmetry. All other goods is included as 
the sixth equation so the estimates are unconditional. The 
dynamic form of the model is rejected. No distinction is made 
between domestic and imported beer or domestic or imported 
spirits. Given the low unconditional budget share of alcoholic 
beverages, similar Marshallian and Hicksian own-price 
elasticity estimates were expected.   
                         
DAIDS  Dom.  C   .96 2.22  .08  M  -.48 -.51 -.54  Andrikopoulos 




DAIDS Imp.  C    6.38  6.00  .83  M  -1.02  -.70  -.34 
       DAIDS  Dom.  C    -  -  -  H  -.08 -.39 -.51 
       DAIDS  Imp.  C    -  -  -  H -1.00  -.35 -.27 
The data are annual. A static version of the model is rejected. 
Homogeneity and symmetry are imposed. Elasticity estimates 
are evaluated at sample means. 
                         






DAIDS Imp.  C    1.02  .70  1.45  H  -1.00  -.56  -.72 
                       
The data are annual and estimates are evaluated at sample 
means. Homogeneity and symmetry are imposed. A static 
version of the model is estimated and rejected. Spirits refers 
to brandy. Various dynamic specifications are estimated. 
                         




   AIDS    C    .89  1.61  .98  M  -.95  -.93  -1.32 
Data are annual. Non-economic variables are considered. For 
the conditional model homogeneity and symmetry are 
rejected. The paper includes a cider elasticity estimate. 
                         





                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
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Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         





               
Annual data. Symmetry and homogeneity are imposed and 
not rejected. Non-economic variables are considered. 
                         




   Rotterdam  C    -  -  -  H  -.18 -.42 -.77 
   Canada  1955-85  Rotterdam  C    .74 1.05 1.25  F  -.15 -.60 -.61 
       Rotterdam  C    -  -  -  H  -.21 -.40 -.47 
   Finland  1970-83  Rotterdam  C    .45 1.32 1.32  F  -.61  -1.78  -1.78 
       Rotterdam  C   -  -  -  H -.51  -1.46  -1.46 
Data are annual. Symmetry and homogeneity are imposed, 
and in general not rejected. Estimates are evaluated at sample 
means. The paper presents Frisch elasticity estimates only. 
However, from the information published in the paper it is 
possible to calculate Slutsky own-price elasticity estimates. 
As expected, the calculated Slutsky estimates are all larger 
than the corresponding Frisch elasticities. 
   N.Z.  1965-82  Rotterdam  C   .84  .88  1.45  F  -.37 -.39 -.64   
       Rotterdam  C    -  -  -  H  -.17 -.34 -.57   
   Norway  1960-86  Rotterdam  C    .34 1.48 1.55  F  -.03 -.12 -.12   
       Rotterdam  C    -  -  -  H  -.02 -.10 -.10   
   Sweden  1967-84  Rotterdam  C   .21  .69  1.52  F  -.30 -.99 -2.18   
       Rotterdam  C   -  -  -  H -.28  -.88  -1.94   
   U.K.  1955-85  Rotterdam  C    .82 1.06 1.34  F  -.44 -.57 -.72   
       Rotterdam  C    -  -  -  H  -.24 -.48 -.60   
(continued next page)  52
 
TABLE A2.1 (CONTINUED) 
SUMMARY DETAILS OF PAPERS AND ESTIMATES 
 Income  Elasticity  Own-Price  Elasticity  Author(s) and  
Date  Source  Country/ 
Region  Period Framework  Demand 
Model   Beer Wine Spirits Type  Beer Wine Spirits
Comments 





(1987)     Working  C   -   -  -  H  -.12 -.34 -.52 
      Working  C   -   -  -  M  -.65 -.42 -.92 
   U.K. 1955-75  Working  C    .41 1.91 1.81  F  -.25 -.52 -.79 
      Working  C   -   -  -  H  -.19 -.23 -.24 
      Working  C   -   -  -  M  -.43 -.48 -.74 
   U.S. 1949-82  Working  C   .75  .46  1.34  F  -.22 -.23 -.51 
Data are annual. Estimates are presented for each year. The 
values reported here are the mean elasticity estimates. 
Homogeneity and symmetry are imposed, tested, and not 
rejected. Cross-country pooling is tested and rejected.   
       Working  C   -   -  -  H  -.09 -.22 -.10   
       Working  C    -  -  -  M  -.44 -.26 -.71   
                         





    Rotterdam  U   .80  .75  1.91  H  -.36 -.43 -.74 
Data are annual. Symmetry and homogeneity are tested and 
not rejected. Two intercept (trend) terms are included in the 
demand equations. Estimates are at sample means. 
                         
                         





Economics                     
Data are annual and for a 30 state panel. The study estimates 
the demand response to changes in tax rates. Elasticity 
estimates evaluated at 1968. 
                         





   ________  (L)  -   -   -  -  - -1.39  -.84  -.30 
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         
U.K. 1983-92  AIDS  C    -  -  -   M   -.90 -.70  -1.42 






                    
Annual data. Non-economic variables are considered. The 
first estimate is for 1992 the second is for 1993, following the 
introduction of the EU single market. Only for wine is the 
hypothesis of no change between periods rejected. 
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 1993-96  AIDS  C    -  -  -  M -.76  -1.69  -.86 
Annual data. Non-economic variables are considered. The 
first estimate is for the four years prior to the EU single   
market, the second the four years following the single market. 
                         







Linear  (2SLS)  U    .85 2.22 1.67  H  -  -1.00  -.77 
Quarterly data. Results are from the model with homogeneity 
imposed. 2SLS is used because of the possibility of feedback 
from sales to advertising. Multiple specifications estimated.  
                         




Review      Rotterdam  U    .70 2.18 1.78  H  -.36  -1.13  -.85 
Annual data. Estimates at sample means. Symmetry and 
homogeneity are tested and not rejected. Advertising is 
incorporated in the model, but shown to have little effect. 
                         




Modeling   
1963Q1-
88Q4 
Rotterdam  II  C    .72 2.87 2.34  H  -  -.33 -.72 
       AIDS  I  C    1.07  3.36  1.36  H  -.24  -1.10  -.76 
        AIDS  II  C    .99 3.07 1.49  H  -.08 -.92 -.64 
        DAIDS  II  C    1.44 2.37 2.53  H  -.29 -.86 -.97 
       DAIDS  II  C    1.19  2.07  2.06  H  -.34  -.85  -1.13 
Quarterly data. Estimates at sample means. Symmetry and 
homogeneity are tested and not rejected. Advertising is 
included in the model in two different forms. Tobacco, and 
other non-durable expenditures are also included in the 
system. Although the estimates vary little with different 
system-wide specifications, the author favours the Rotterdam 
specification, a specification which indicates no advertising 
effects. 
                         







AIDS  C    .79 1.18 1.34  H -.12 -.67 -.72 
        CBS  C    .78 1.28 1.29  H -.15 -.82 -.76 
        NBR  C    .78 1.14 1.39  H -.10 -.68 -.68 
Quarterly data. Estimates at sample means. Symmetry and 
homogeneity are tested and not rejected Advertising is 
included in the model. Following testing the author favours 
the AIDS specification. This study is valuable as it allows us 
to see -- for a given data set -- different system-wide 
approaches give similar results. 
                         







AIDS TECM (1) C    .98  .67  1.30  H  -.37  -.08  -.73 
        AIDS  C   .98  .85  1.17  H -.37 -.22 -.93 
Quarterly data. System-wide tests reject homogeneity for the 
static model but not the dynamic model. Advertising is 
included, but the estimates indicate it has little effect. 
Evaluated at sample means. 
(continued next page)  54
 
TABLE A2.1 (CONTINUED) 
SUMMARY DETAILS OF PAPERS AND ESTIMATES 
 Income  Elasticity  Own-Price  Elasticity  Author(s) and  
Date  Source  Country/ 
Region  Period Framework  Demand 
Model   Beer Wine Spirits Type  Beer Wine Spirits
Comments 





   AIDS  U    1.03  2.33  1.04  M  -.77  -1.59  -.75 
        DAIDS  (S)  U   .16 1.86  .86  M  -.53 -.80 -.85 
                       
Annual data. Non-economic variables are included in the 
model. The evidence regarding homogeneity and symmetry is 
mixed. There is some confusion regarding conditional and 
unconditional estimates in the paper. The estimates presented 
are the authors preferred estimates and are from specifications 
including non-economic variables. 
                         
N’lands  1960-83  _________  -    - - -  - -  -.50  -  Eecen (1985)  Edwards et 
al. (1994) 
                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         





Modelling                     
Annual Data. The article and results are difficult to interpret. 
                         




  1978-92  Linear  switch U    - -  -  M  - -  -.16 
Annual data. Switching regression model. The post-78 
estimate of the income elasticity was negative and not 
statistically different from zero. 
                         




  1983-92  Linear  switch U    - -  -  H - - - 
Annual data. Switching regression model. The post-83 
estimate of the price elasticity was positive and not 
statistically different from zero. Income elasticity negative. 
                         




   Synthetic C    -  -  -  M  -.22 -.32 -.70 
                       
One week survey data. Combines the Rotterdam, AIDS, and 
CBS models. Non-economic variables included in the model. 
Homogeneity and symmetry imposed.  
                         




    Linear  II  U    -  1.34  1.07  H  -1.43 -1.30 -1.90 
Annual data. Evaluated at 1980. I McGuinness (1980) 
formulation. II Duffy (1983) formulation.  Results are the 
average of different functional forms.  
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et de stat.                     
Monthly data. The focus of the paper is the estimation of the 
cross-price elasticity of different beer brands. At the brand 
level the AIDS model in the conditional setting is used.  
                         





and Statistics                    
Following testing to confirm validity, the four years worth of 
cross-section data are pooled. Various functional forms are 
estimated, and the results are the authors preferred estimates.  
                         




     C    -  -  .92  H  - -  -1.21 
       AIDS  II  C   1.45  .82  .75  H  -.13 -.95 -.26 
         C    -  -  .93  H  - -  -.58 
       AIDS  III  C   1.47  .84  .78  H  -.51 -.51 -.91 
         C     - -  .83  H - -  -.91 
Annual data. In the spirit column the first entry is for: vodka 
gin, and aquavit; the second: other spirits. The different 
models allow for different treatment of quality changes. 
Symmetry is not imposed at the initial stage of estimation 
although homogeneity and symmetry are imposed with 
respect to the quality parameters. Incudes quality indices, and 
dummy variables for strikes and structural change. While all 
specifications fit fairly well, the author expresses a preference 
for specification III. 
                         





Economics       C    -  -  -  H  -  -  -1.24 
Data observations every four months. In the spirit column the
first entry is for: vodka gin, and aquavit; the second: other
spirits. Symmetry and homogeneity imposed.  
                         




                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         





                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
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   Linear  (L)  U    .06  -  .40  H  -.38  -1.60  -1.30 
Annual data. Pooled across provinces. Non-economic 
variables included. Elasticity estimates evaluated at sample 
means. 
                         





and Statistics    Linear  (L)  U    -  -  .16  H  -.30  -1.73  -1.53 
Annual data. Estimates are the average of three different least 
squares formulations. Non-economic variables are included.  
                         




and Statistics     Linear  I  (L)  U    .43 2.60 1.30  H  -.28  -1.26  - 
        Linear II (S)  U    .27  .90  .95  H  -.28  -.80  -.73 
Annual data. Linear model I is of a log-linear ECM form, 
while model II is a cointegration model in levels. Non-
economic variables are included. Results are the average of 
lag length (1) and (2). Evaluated at sample means.  
        Linear II (L)  U    .27  2.19  1.02  H  -.14  -1.17  -   
                         




Research   
1964Q1-
83Q4 
AIDS (H)  C    -  1.05  -  H  -  -.65  - 
        AIDS  (N-H)  C    .50 1.67 1.21  H  -.40 -.94 -.79 
Quarterly data. Symmetry and homogeneity imposed. System 
includes tobacco. Compares a habit forming model (H) and a 
non-habit forming model (N-H). Evaluated at 1983. Second 
entry in the wine column is for cider.   
       AIDS  (N-H)  C    -  1.37  -  H  -  -.62  -   
                         
Labys (1976)  France  1954-71  Linear  U    -  - -  H -  -.06 - 





Economics  Portugal 1954-71  Linear  U   -   .05 -  H -  -.68 - 
   Spain  1954-71  Linear  U   -   .14 -  H -  -.37 - 
Annual data. Several further elasticity values are reported in 
the paper, but these values have been taken from previous 
studies.  
   Germany  1954-71  Linear  U   -   .51 -  H -  -.38 -   
   U.S.  1954-71  Linear    Dom.  U   -   2.34 -  H -  -.44 -   
   U.S.  1954-71  Linear  Imp.    U   -   3.34 -  H -  -1.65 -   
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Canada 1949-69 Linear  U    .20 1.43  .68  H  -.03  -1.65  -1.45  Lau (1975)  Gibbins et 
al. (1975) 
                   
Annual data. Several different functional forms are estimated. 
The results reported here are the results from the authors 
preferred specification. 
                         





   Linear  (L)  U    .11  -  -  H -.72  -  - 
Annual data. Advertising variables and other dummy 
variables are included. Assume evaluated at means. Results 
are the average of different linear specifications. 
                         




                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         
U.K.  1956-79 Linear  U    .13 1.11 1.54  H  -.30 -.17 -.38  McGuinness 
(1983) 
Grant et al. 
(1983) 
                   
Annual data. Evaluated at 1979. Advertising and the number 
of licensed premises are included as variables. 
                         





Ag. Econs.                     
The estimate is arrived at by forecasting alternative wine 
consumption patterns. Three estimates are given and the 
authors suggest -1.80 as the most appropriate estimate.  
                         




Economics       Linear  II  U    .48 1.05 1.02  M  -.56  -1.86  -.89 
Cross-section model. Non-economic variables are included in 
both models, but a greater number of non-economic variables 
are included in specification II. 
                         




Journal   
1977Q3-
94Q4 
Rotterdam  I  C    .77 1.90 1.06  H  -.11 -.44 -.10 
        Rotterdam  II  C    .76 1.72 1.13  H  -.20 -.67 -.16 
        Rotterdam  II  C    .75 1.83 1.11  H  -.11 -.32 -.15 
Quarterly data. Advertising is included either at an 
aggregated level, or disaggregated between broadcast and 
print media. Estimated advertising elasticities are either not 
statistically different from zero or very low in magnitude. 
Symmetry and homogeneity are tested and not rejected. 
Model II is in terms of ethanol. Evaluated at sample means.  
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    AIDS  C    .80 1.40 1.13  H  -.08 -.26 -.13 
        CBS  C    .80 1.34 1.15  H  -.05 -.07 -.11 
        NBR  C    .77 1.31 1.19  H  -.07 -.27 -.12 
        Rotterdam  C    - - -  M  -.41  -.22  -.60 
        AIDS  C    - - -  M  -.47  -.40  -.60 
Annual data. Strong support is found for homogeneity and 
symmetry for all four models. Estimates including advertising 
variables are also presented. However, as the estimated 
advertising elasticities are either not statistically different 
from zero or very low in magnitude the estimates from these 
models are not reported here. The estimates are evaluated at 
sample means. Different system-wide approaches give similar 
results, and no preference for a particular specification is 
given. 
        CBS  C    - - -  M  -.44  -.20  -.58   
        NBR  C    - - -  M  -.44  -.40  -.62   
                         





1947-60                 
Annual data. While there are multiple specifications in the 
thesis, these are the results for which complete details of the 
transformation into retail elasticities are given.  
                         




                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         
Finland 1949-62 _________  -   .22  .97  .42  -  -.49 -.83 -.13  Nyberg  
(1967) 
Lau (1975) 
          - -  1.30  - - -  -.95 
                       
Taken from the secondary literature. Results for a dynamic 
model are also reported, however the values for the dynamic 
model are either extreme, or positive. The first entry in the 
spirit column is for vodka, the second for other spirits. 
                         





Research   1976-78  Linear  U    -  -  -  H -.12  -  - 
Cross-section data. Includes non-economic variables. 
Represents the average of specifications with different 
explanatory variables. 
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   Linear  (L)  U    -  1.23  -  H  -.62  -  - 
Annual data. Advertising expenditure tested and then omitted. 
Various estimation results are reported, these are from the 
Ridge regression, and are preferred by the author.  
                         




   _________  (L)  -   -   -  -  -  -1.00 -  - 
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         




                   
Annual data. Homogeneity and symmetry imposed and not 
rejected. The paper is an honours dissertation. Estimates at 
sample means. 
                         




                   
Annual data. Homogeneity and symmetry imposed and not 
rejected. The study estimates the elasticity of bottled, canned, 
and bulk beer. The estimates reported are the group estimates. 
                         




Statistics   
1870-38 
               
Annual data excluding 1915-19. Multiple model forms are 
estimated, and although the author is cautious in expressing a 
preference, the reported results are the preferred estimates.  
                         




      U   .44 1.26  .95  H  -.16 -.66 -.66 
Annual data. Homogeneity and symmetry imposed and not 
rejected. Evaluated at sample mean. Honours dissertation. 
                         
U.K. Linear  (S)  ECM  U    .37  .77  .59  H  -.21  -.55  -1.52  Salisu and 
Balasubraman
-yam (1997)  
Applied 
Economics 
Letters   
1963Q1-
92Q3 
Linear (L) ECM  U    .76  1.42  .88  H  -.32  -.66  -1.28 
Quarterly data. Homogeneity is rejected for wine, so the wine 
estimates are from the unrestricted model. The beer and spirit 
estimates are from the homogeneity restricted model. 
                         
Finland 1969-86 _________  -   -   -  -  -  -.60 -1.30  -1.00  Salo (1990)  Edwards et 
al. (1994) 
                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
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      U    .41 1.74 2.18  H  -.20 -.49 -.79 
Annual data. Homogeneity and symmetry imposed and not 
rejected. Evaluated at sample means. Unconditional estimates 
obtained using the alcohol group equation.  
                         
Australia  1955-98 Rotterdam  C    .79 1.00 1.80  H  -.20 -.43 -.64 








(2005)  Canada 1953-99 Rotterdam  C    .67 1.18 1.32  H  -.22 -.48 -.29 
        Linear  C    .64 1.35 1.35  H  -.43 -.60 -.49 
    Finland 1969-85 Rotterdam  C    .44 1.52 1.29  H  -.24 -.78 -.30 
        Linear  C    .42 1.63 1.24  H  -.81 -.39  -1.43 
    France  1971-95 Rotterdam  C   .66  .88  1.23  H  -.06 -.05 -.06 
Annual data. For the system-wide estimates homogeneity is 
rejected for the U.S. while symmetry is not rejected for any 
country at the 1 percent level. The study is interesting as it 
gives a direct comparison between linear single-equation 
(double-log) estimates and system-wide estimates. This 
information can help in framing the meta-analysis. The 
income elasticity estimates for both approaches are similar. In 
absolute value the own-price elasticity estimates from the 
linear model are almost universally higher. Estimates are 
evaluated at sample means. 
        Linear  C   .65  .85  1.29  H  -.08 -.09 -.14   
    Japan  1964-02 Rotterdam  C    1.28 .63  1.02  H  -.12 -.13 -.24   
        Linear  C    1.31 .50  1.26  H  -.33 -.06 -.44   
    N.Z.  1965-82 Rotterdam  C   .84  .87  1.45  H  -.18 -.34 -.40   
        Linear  C    .81 1.15 1.53  H  -.23 -.78 -.43   
    Norway 1960-96 Rotterdam  C    .37 1.23 1.72  H  -.04 -.14 -.09   
        Linear  C    .40 1.38 1.64  H  -  -.18 -.21   
    Sweden 1960-99 Rotterdam  C   .79  .46  1.35  H  -.45 -.32 -.35   
        Linear  C   .81  .40  1.15  H  -.29 -.76 -.84   
    U.K.  1955-02 Rotterdam  C   .88  .67  1.51  H  -.27 -.35 -.56   
        Linear  C   .80  .91  1.44  H  -.67 -.41 -.80   
    U.S.  1949-00 Rotterdam  C    .80 1.06 1.24  H  -.13 -.27 -.18   
        Linear  C    .81 1.18 1.35  H  -.29 -.39 -.26   
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Canada 1953-82 Rotterdam  C   .71  .97  1.29  H  -.26 -.16 -.01 
    Finland 1969-83 Rotterdam  C    .40 1.58 1.29  H  -.54 -.86 -.73 
   Japan  1964-83  Rotterdam  C    1.43  .29  .47  H  -.25  -  -.68 
    N.Z.  1965-82 Rotterdam  C    .90 1.13 1.18  H  -.12 -.42 -.52 
Annual data. Homogeneity and symmetry imposed and not 
rejected for any country at the 1 percent level. Cross-country 
pooling is tested and rejected. Estimates evaluated at sample 
means. 
    Norway 1960-86 Rotterdam  C    .34 1.44 1.56  H  -.14 -.07 -.18   
    Sweden 1960-86 Rotterdam  C   .22  .48  1.52  H  -.35 -.87 -.22   
    U.K.  1955-85 Rotterdam  C    .52 1.31 1.83  H  -.13 -.40 -.31   
    U.S.  1949-82 Rotterdam  C   .71  .63  1.36  H  -.11 -.05 -.11   
                         
Australia  1956-99 Rotterdam  C   .66  .83  2.47  H  -.16 -.31 -.62  Applied 
Economics 
   Rotterdam  U    .46  .60  1.80  H  -.33  -.39  -1.30 
Annual data. Considers the age distribution of the drinking 
population. Homogeneity and symmetry are not rejected. 




(2004)                         
                         
Simon  (1966)  Econmetrica U.S. 1950-61  Experimental  U    - -  -  M  - -  -.79 
                       
Median estimate for the different states. Time and cross-
section approach. Compares the before and after consumption  
level following price changes of more than 2 percent. 
                         




Economics                     
Cross-section data. Focuses on incorporating the illicit market 
for distilled spirits, with particular focus on the evasion of the 
state tax levied on wholesalers.  
                         
Stone (1945)  U.K.  1929-41  Linear  U    .14  -  .54  H  -.73  -  -.72 
 
J. of the 
Royal Stat. 
Society                     
Annual data. Seminal work in the field of demand analysis. A 
variety of specifications are tested for both spirits and beer. 
The author’s preferred estimates are presented. 
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Stone (1951)  Stone (1951) U.K.  1920-38  Linear  U    -  -  .60  H  -.69  -1.17  -.57  Annual data. Based on the Newmarch Lectures of 1948-49. 
                         




   Linear  (L)  U    .52  -  - H  -.40 -  - 
Quarterly data. The first time a dynamic framework had been 
considered. Estimates are also given for the category other 
alcoholic drink.   
                         





                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         




Economics                     
The paper uses the homogeneity condition, other elasticity 
estimates, and consumption forecasts to infer the income and 
own-price elasticity values.  
                         




 1980-84  Linear  Kalman  U    .68  .68  1.81  H  -.76 -1.10 -.86 
Annual data. The Kalman filter approach is used to test for 
structural change. Estimates for a model with advertising are 
also reported. Estimates at sample means. 
                         
Ireland AIDS  -    .80 1.23 1.39  -  -.68 -1.60  -1.42  Thom (1984)  Eakins and 
Gallagher 
(2003)   
1969Q1-
80Q4 
               
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         




Research                     
Annual data. Cross-section model. Homogeneity rejected and 
symmetry not rejected  
                         





                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
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    Linear  II  U   .12  .99  .49  H  -.26 -.38 -.45 
Annual data. Non-economic variables included. Evaluated at 
1975 level. Formulation of the dependant variable differs 
between the models. Symmetry imposed. 
                         




                   
Taken from the secondary literature. 
                         




    Rotterdam  C   .94 1.62  .94  H  -.25 -.99 -.51 
Annual data. The evidence with respect to homogeneity and 
symmetry is borderline. Masters thesis. 
                         
Notes:  Demand Model: (C) denotes Conditional setting and (U) denotes Unconditional setting. 
    Framework: Imp. refers to an imported beverage, Dom. refers to a domestically produced beverage. Linear refers to single-equation estimation approaches. (S) denotes short run estimate (L) denotes long run estimate.  









   64
APPENDIX 2.2 
THE GEOMETRY OF DRINKING 
 
When considering any three products with market shares that sum to 100 
percent, it is possible to express the market share information within an equilateral 
triangle. Such an approach can be useful as it highlights relationships which are not 
immediately obvious when data are formatted into a table. The per capita ethanol 
market share consumption data for 19 countries shown in the right-hand panel of Table 
2.4, and reproduced below in Table A2.2, sum to 100 percent, and as such can be 
displayed within an equilateral triangle. 
 
 
Consider Figure A2.1. The figure shows an equilateral triangle with wine on the 
right-hand axis, beer on the left-hand axis, and spirits on the horizontal axis. Further, the 
figure illustrates how to read the consumption information represented by the triangle. 
For any given consumption combination of beer, wine, and spirits, there is a unique 
point within the triangle associated with that combination. Consider the point E. To 
work out the percent of ethanol ingested from beer associated with this point, draw a 
line parallel to the wine axis from E to the beer axis. The value  b s  is the percent of total 
ethanol consumed attributable to beer. To find wine’s market share, draw a line parallel 
to the spirits axis from E to the wine axis. The value  w s   is the percent of ethanol 
consumed attributable to wine. Finally, a line drawn parallel to the beer axis from E to 
the spirits axis, will give the ethanol share for spirits,  . s s  By construction  b s
  +  w s  +  s s  
= 100. 
 
Figure A2.2 plots the ethanol market share information for each country listed in 
Table A2.2, and provides an easy way to classify countries. Points in the bottom left 
triangle represent points of consumption where more than 50 percent of the total   
ethanol intake is from beer. Similarly, points in the top and bottom right triangles 
represent points where, respectively, wine and spirits are the dominant beverages. The 
centre triangle represents an area where no single beverage accounts for more than 50 
percent of the consumer’s ethanol intake. 
 
Most countries in the sample, 68 percent, are beer drinking countries. Only one, 
Poland, is clearly a spirit drinking country, although perhaps Cyprus could also be   65
considered a spirit drinking country. Italy, France, and Portugal are clearly wine 
drinking countries, while the Spanish appear to have an equal enthusiasm for all 
beverage types. 
 
When considering the per capita ethanol consumption data in Table A2.2, the 
similarities and differences in alcohol consumption patterns between countries are not 
immediately clear. Yet plotting the data within an equilateral triangle as shown in 
Figure A2.2 readily reveals a range of interesting features. For example, the ethanol 
share for beer, wine, and spirits is quite similar in Anglophone and Nordic countries. 
Also, with the exception of Germany, the ethanol share for beer, wine, and spirits in 















































THE GEOMETRY OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN 1996 
Market share (percent)    (X,Y) Co-ordinates 
No. Country 
Beer  Wine  Spirits  Total    X co-ordinate  Y co-ordinate 
1. Australia  57.43  26.30  16.27  100    29.42  22.78 
2. Canada  55.80  15.70  28.50  100    36.35  13.60 
3. Cyprus  34.00  20.50  45.50  100    55.75  17.75 
4. Finland  58.97  13.05  27.97  100    34.50  11.30 
5. France  17.05  62.00  20.95  100    51.95  53.69 
6. Germany  58.17  23.67  18.16  100    30.00  20.50 
7. Ireland  67.10  16.92  15.98  100    24.44  14.65 
8. Italy  13.81  75.81  10.38  100    48.29  65.65 
9. Japan  53.77  2.35 43.89  100    45.07  2.04 
10. Kenya  52.73 .61  46.67  100    46.98  0.53 
11. Netherlands  52.35  25.61 22.04  100    34.85  22.18 
12. New  Zealand  59.84  25.37 14.79  100    27.48  21.97 
13. Norway  60.33  20.85 18.82  100    29.25  18.06 
14. Poland  33.08  13.38 53.54  100    60.23  11.59 
15. Portugal  27.72  65.11  7.17  100    39.73  56.39 
16. Spain  34.90  39.24 25.86  100    45.48  33.98 
17. Sweden  51.63  27.94 20.43  100    34.40  24.20 
18. U.K.  63.40  19.40 17.20  100    26.90  16.80 
19. U.S.  60.16  12.57 27.27  100    33.56  10.89 
Source:   Consumption information: Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005). 






























THE GEOMETRY OF DRINKING   67
Converting the Data to (X,Y) Co-ordinates  
 
Before the market share data contained in the left-hand panel of Table A2.2 can 
be plotted, it is useful to first convert the market share information into (X,Y) co-
ordinates. As discussed in Clements and Lan (2000) the process of converting the per 
capita market share data into (X,Y) co-ordinates is straight forward, and is achieved by 
drawing on the properties of the 90º, 60º, 30º triangle. Consider Figure A2.3, and the 
triangle  FGH. This triangle has properties such that if  , FH a =   () 2, GH a =  and 
() 23 . FG a =  
 
Now consider Figure A2.4. The figure shows an equilateral triangle overlayed 
onto an (X,Y) axis, and includes, for reference, a 90º, 60º, 30º triangle. Using the 
properties of the 90º, 60º, 30º triangle, the Y co-ordinates for each country can be found. 
In Figure A2.4. the angle ABC equals FHG which implies  . w FH s =   This in turn 
implies FG, the Y co-ordinate, is ( ) 23 . w s  As such, any point on the ray ab, shown in 
Figure A2.4, represents an acceptable Y co-ordinate. So, for Australia, as  26.30, w s =  
the relevant Y co-ordinate is ( ) 26.30 2 3 22.78. =  
 
Finding the X co-ordinate is slightly more complex. First consider the spirits 
information. If the market share of spirits is  s s  then by moving along the spirits, or X 
axis, by the distance  , s s  it is possible to identify all points consistent with an ethanol 
market share for spirits of  . s s  In Figure A2.5 they are the points along the ray cd, which 
is a ray parallel to the beer axis. The intersection of the ray ab and the ray cd, the point 
K, is the (X,Y) co-ordinate, which, when interpreted as shown in Figure A2.1, gives the 
ethanol share information for beer, wine, and spirits. 
 
As the slope of the ray cd is the same as FH, the length of the ray between the 
X-axis and the point K is  . w s  Given this information it is now possible to find the X co-
ordinate. As shown in Figure A2.6, by drawing a vertical ray through the point K down 
to the X-axis, it becomes clear the X co-ordinate is equal to  s s
 plus (by the properties of 
the 90º, 60º, 30º triangle) () 2. w s  So, for each country there exists a single consumption 
point in (X,Y) space representing the relative ethanol intake of beer, wine, and spirits.   68
For Australia, as  16.27, s s =  and  26.30, w s =   the X co-ordinate is 
() 16.27 26.30 2 29.42, +=  and so the (X,Y) co-ordinate for Australia is (29.42, 22.78). 
FIGURE A2.3 
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FIGURE A2.5 
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APPENDIX 2.3 
UNIVARIATE TESTS FOR EQUALITY OF MEAN ELASTICITY VALUES 
 
If  ik η  is used to denote the mean elasticity estimate of beverage i in country k, 
and  ik S  denotes the associated standard deviation, then a symmetric t-test of whether the 
mean own-price elasticity of beverage i is the same in country k and j where  , kj ≠ can 
be established as 
22 ,
ik ij






where  ik N  represents the number of elasticity 
observations for beverage i from country k. So, for example, the calculated t-value when 









, which is the value shown in the beer panel of Table 
A2.3, column Australia, row Canada. 
 
The degrees of freedom for the test, while generally not known exactly, can be 
estimated using the Welch-Satterthwaite approximation, where the degrees of freedom 





ik ik ij ij





  So, for example, the approximate 





.23 15 .27 22
33.2.




 The critical t-value for a two-tailed test at 
the 95 precent confidence level with the degrees of freedom implied by the Welch-
Satterthwaite approximation is therefore 2.05. As the absolute value of the calculated t-
statistic is less than the critical value, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of equal 
mean beer own-price elasticity estimates for Australia and Canada. 
 
As the test is symmetric, results are shown only in the lower diagonal of Table 
A2.3. The table shows, for beer, wine, and spirits, the calculated test statistic for each 
pair-wise country comparison. Cases where it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of 
equality of mean elasticity estimates are indicated in bold. For each country, and for 
each beverage, Table A2.3 also shows the percentage rejection rate. Although the table 
is read in the same manner as Table 2.6, it remains useful  to illustrate how Table A2.3 
is read by way of example. Consider the Japan row in the beer panel of Table A2.3. By   71
reading across the Japan row to the Japan column, it is clear the hypothesis of equal 
mean own-price elasticity estimates for beer, between Japan and country k, is rejected 
for k equal to Finland and Ireland. However, by reading down the Japan row it is also 
possible to see the hypothesis of equal mean own-price elasticity estimates for beer 
between Japan and country k is also rejected for the case of k equal to the UK and the 
US. As the null hypothesis is rejected 4 times, and for Japan there are 12 pair-wise 
comparisons, the rejection rate for beer is 4 12 33 percent. =  The remaining columns, 
rows, and panels of Table A2.3 can be interpreted similarly. In total, for beer, there are 
78 unique pair-wise country comparisons, and the null is rejected on 18 occasions, or 23 
percent of the time. For both spirits and wine it is possible to make 66 unique pair-wise 
country comparisons, and the null is rejected on 33 occasions, or 50 percent of the time 
for wine, and on 15 occasions, or 23 percent of the time for spirits. 
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TABLE A2.3 
COUNTRY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY COMPARISON: CALCULATED T-STATISTIC FOR BEER 
Country Australia  Canada Cyprus Finland France Germany  Ireland Italy Japan  Kenya  N’lands  NZ  Norway  Poland  Portugal  Spain  Sweden UK  US 
Australia  --                        
Canada -.36  --                       
Cyprus .94 1.03 --                      
Finland 1.71 2.10  -.51  --                      
France  -5.02 -4.66 -1.87  -7.70  --                    
Germany -  -  -  -  -  --                  
Ireland 1.63 1.89 -.32 .49 4.65  -  --                    
Italy -  -  -  -  -  -  -  --               
Japan -1.61  -1.28  -1.36  -3.29  2.50 - -2.73  -  --              
Kenya .89 .98  -.02  .47  1.80 -  .29 -  1.30  --             
N’lands -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  --             
N.Z  -.28 -.07  -1.00  -1.25  1.96  -  -1.41 -  .68 -.95  -  --           
Norway  -4.66 -4.31 -1.90  -7.02  -0.32 - -4.58  - -2.42  -1.83 - -1.99  --          
Poland  - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - --        
Portugal  - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - - --       
Spain - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - - -  --      
Sweden 1.22  1.30  .32  .86  2.02  -  .68  -  1.58 .34  -  1.26 2.04  -  -  -  --    
UK  1.36 1.76 -.61 -.38 7.39  - -.75  -  2.98  -.56 -  1.05  6.70  - - -  -.93  --   
US 1.86  2.13  -.26 .69 5.09  - .14  -  3.00  -.23 -  1.56  4.98  - - -  -.63  .95  -- 
Reject (%)  17  33  0  33  50  -  25  -  33  0  -  0  50  -  -  -  0  25  33 
(continued next page)   73
TABLE A2.3 (CONTINUED) 
COUNTRY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY COMPARISON: CALCULATED T-STATISTIC FOR WINE 
Country Australia  Canada Cyprus Finland France Germany  Ireland Italy Japan  Kenya  N’lands  NZ  Norway  Poland  Portugal  Spain  Sweden UK  US 
Australia  --                        
Canada .09  --                       
Cyprus -1.36  -2.04 --                      
Finland 1.34 1.65 2.79  --                      
France  -3.39 -8.62 -2.02  -5.09  --                    
Germany -  -  -  -  -  --                  
Ireland  2.34 2.79 3.71 1.08  5.79  -  --                    
Italy -  -  -  -  -  -  -  --               
Japan  -3.19 -7.63 -1.80  -4.88  0.81 - -5.62  -  --              
Kenya -  -  -  - -  -  - - - --             
N’lands -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  --             
N.Z -.96  -1.73  .66  -2.56 4.04  -  -3.56  -  3.62  - -  --           
Norway  -3.13 -7.89 -1.71  -4.84  2.35 - -5.58  - .50 -  - -3.57  --          
Poland  - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - --        
Portugal  - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - - --       
Spain - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - - -  --      
Sweden .78  1.05  2.52 -.79 6.19  - -1.95  -  5.82  - -  2.28 5.81  - - -  --    
UK -.09  -.36  1.84  -1.84  8.65  -  -2.96  -  7.56  - -  1.47  7.87  - - -  -1.32  --   
US -.43  -.84  1.24  -2.03  4.87  -  -3.09  -  4.45  - -  .73  4.42  - - -  -1.58  -.57  -- 
Reject (%)  36  36  18  45  73  -  82  -  73  -  -  55  73  -  -  -  36  36  36 
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TABLE A2.3 (CONTINUED) 
COUNTRY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY COMPARISON: CALCULATED T-STATISTIC FOR SPIRIT 
Country Australia  Canada Cyprus Finland France Germany  Ireland Italy Japan  Kenya  N’lands  NZ  Norway  Poland  Portugal  Spain  Sweden UK  US 
Australia  --                        
Canada .30  --                       
Cyprus -.96  -1.03 --                      
Finland 1.79 1.33 1.80  --                      
France  -8.41 -5.27 -1.25  -5.67  --                    
Germany -  -  -  -  -  --                  
Ireland .82 .48  1.28  -.79  4.88  -  --                    
Italy -  -  -  -  -  -  -  --               
Japan -1.92  -1.79  .00  -2.83  2.61 - -2.05  - --              
Kenya -  -  -  - -  -  - - - --             
N’lands -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  --             
N.Z  -3.28  -2.24 .11 -3.33 6.40  - -2.41  - .22 -  -  --           
Norway -2.11 -2.05 -.39 -2.94  1.19 - -2.28  - -.59 -  - -.87 --          
Poland  - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - --        
Portugal  - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - - --       
Spain - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - - -  --      
Sweden .63  .44 1.16 -.48 3.12  - .10  -  1.55  -  -  1.60  1.84  -  -  - --    
UK 1.18  .45  1.31  -1.19  9.80  - -.19  -  2.63  -  -  4.66 2.64  - - -  -.24  --   
US -.08  -.30  .87  -1.58  4.85  -  -.74 -  1.50 -  - 1.83  1.81 -  -  - -.62  -.83  -- 
Reject  (%)  18 9 0  54  73 -  9 -  9 - -  36  27 -  - - 9  27  9   75
APPENDIX 2.4 
MULTICOLLINEARITY BETWEEN REGRESSORS   
 
  Moderate to strong multicollinearity -- in the sense of high intercorrelations 
between explanatory variables -- is common in almost all applied economic work. It 
should however be noted that a high degree of intercorrelation between explanatory 
variables in itself is not a sufficient or necessary condition for imprecise least squares 
estimates. The correlation matrix provides a direct measure of the correlation between 
explanatory variables, and several tests have been proposed for determining whether 
multicollinearity is problematic. However, in reality the tests provide more an indication 
of the severity of the problem rather than guidance on how to overcome the problem. 
Common approaches to measuring the extent of multicollinearity include Klein’s rule of 
thumb, the variance-inflation factor, the condition number, and Theil’s measure.  
 
  The complete correlation matrix is shown in Table A2.4, and the correlation 
coefficient between the Level variable and the Ethanol Share variable is .936. As such, 
the issue of multicollinearity between the two variables was investigated further. The 
measure chosen to investigate the extent of multicollinearity between the level variable 
and the ethanol share variable was Klein’s rule of thumb, which based on the discussion 
presented in Maddala (1992, p. 273) may be explained as follows. Let 
2
y R  be  the 
squared multiple correlation coefficient between the regression of the natural logarithm 
of the absolute value of the own-price elasticity estimates and all other explanatory 
variables. Further, let 
2
i R  be the squared multiple correlation coefficient between the 
regression of explanatory variable i on all other explanatory variables. If 
2 2
i y R R <  then 
multicollinearity is regarded as a potential problem. For the data set 
2
y R  equals .508 and 
when i equals the level variable 
2
i R  equals .974, and when i equals the ethanol share 
variable 
2
i R   equals .981. Based on this result, and the correlation matrix values, 
multicollinearity is thought to be a problem for these two variables. As such, particular 
care was taken before determining these two variables could be excluded from the 
model.   76
TABLE A2.4 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Variables   Beer  Wine  Spirit  Marshallian  Frisch Hicksian Conditional  Uncond. Inferred Cross-
section  Linear System  Short  Long  Import Year Quarterly Daily 
Beer  1.000                                  
Wine  -.504 1.000                                 
Spirit  -.492 -.504 1.000                               
Marsh.  -.022 -.002 .024  1.000                             
Frisch  .002 -.004 .002  -.132  1.000                           
Hicks.  .018 .004 -.022  -.780  -.517  1.000                         
Conditional  .019 -.025 .007  -.001  .211  -.133  1.000                       
Unconditional  -.019 .025 -.007  .001  -.211  .133  -1.000  1.000                     
Inferred  -.063 .062 .001  .040  -.027  -.018  -.126  .126  1.000                   
Cross  .001 -.039 .038  .258  -.047  -.194  -.220  .220  -.014  1.000                 
Linear  .000 -.001 .000  -.244  -.183  .326  -.573  .573  -.056  -.097  1.000               
System  .012 .001 -.013  .129  .190  -.231  .613  -.613  -.140  -.245  -.882 1.000             
Short  -.072 .023 .049  .088  .058  -.113  .276  -.276  .018  .031  -.320  .307  1.000           
Long  .072 -.023 -.049  -.088  -.058  .113  -.276  .276  -.018  -.031  .320  -.307  -1.000  1.000         
Import  -.055 .109 -.055  .007  -.052  .026  -.144  .144  -.016  -.027  .034  -.027  .034  -.034  1.000       
Year  .033 -.048 .015  -.023  .105  -.046  .068  -.068  .032  .056  .068  -.080  .064  -.064  -.138 1.000     
Quart  -.036 .053 -.017  -.024  -.097  .082  -.112  .112  -.029  -.051  -.039  .050  -.079  .079  .158  -.918  1.000   
Daily  .001 -.002 .001  .115  -.038  -.075  .091  -.091  -.012  -.020  -.079  .082  .025  -.025  -.022 -.359  -.042  1.000 
Publication  -.023 .008 .015  .089  .052  -.109  .575  -.575  -.197  -.088  -.390  .445  .172  -.172  -.012 -.105  .097  .034 
Mid-point  -.031 .041 -.010  .281  -.040  -.218  .324  -.324  -.071  .090  -.290  .275  .086  -.086  .074  -.262  .209  .168 
(Mid-point)
2  -.031 .041 -.010  .283  -.041  -.219  .324  -.324  -.072  .090  -.290  .276  .087  -.087  .075  -.263  .209  .170 
Australia  .033 .007 -.040  -.038  .089  -.023  .119  -.119  .163  -.054  -.117  .089  .023  -.023  -.060 .123  -.113  -.044 
Canada  -.011  .037  -.026 -.009  -.065 .048  -.229  .229  -.043 -.075  .107  -.089  -.197 .197 .203  -.049 .078 -.061 
Cyprus  .001  -.002  .001  -.057  -.038 .073  .091  -.091  -.012 -.020  -.079 .082  .025  -.025 .356  .046 -.042 -.016 
Finland  .002 -.004 .002  -.109  .056  .059  .174  -.174  -.022  -.038  -.073  .080  .048  -.048  -.043  .087  -.080  -.031 
France  -.013 .026 -.013  -.062  -.041  .079  .057  -.057  -.012  -.022  -.041  .045  .027  -.027  -.024  .049  -.045  -.018 
Ireland  .001 -.002 .001  .352  -.047  -.275  -.109  .109  -.014  -.025  -.097  .101  .031  -.031  -.027  .056  -.051  -.020 
Japan  .014 -.028 .014  -.066  -.044  .085  .106  -.106  -.013  -.023  .033  -.027  .029  -.029  -.026  .053  -.048  -.019 
N.Z.  .002 -.003 .002  .000  .071  -.045  .161  -.161  -.020  -.035  -.055  .062  .044  -.044  -.039  .080  -.074  -.029 
Norway  -.019 .007 .012  -.088  .097  .015  .141  -.141  -.018  -.031  -.059  .065  .039  -.039  -.034  .070  -.065  -.025 
Sweden  .002 -.003 .002  -.091  .090  .022  .146  -.146  -.018  -.032  -.035  .042  .040  -.040  -.036  .073  -.067  -.026 
U.K.  .013 -.026 .013  .014  -.050  .020  -.066  .066  -.056  -.097  .034  -.012  -.004  .004  -.108 -.216  .265  -.079 
U.S.  -.002 -.043 .045  .126  -.045  -.081  -.132  .132  .044  .366  .082  -.131  .046  -.046  -.031  -.058  -.065  .298 
Level  .801  -.410  -.389  .030  -.024 -.011  -.043  .043  -.021 -.001 .025 -.023 -.033  .033 -.088  .047 -.046 -.010 
Ethanol Share  .895  -.496  -.394  -.027  -.008 .028  -.023  .023  -.034 .009 .043 -.039 -.058  .058 -.079  .053 -.056 -.003 
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TABLE A2.4 (CONTINUED) 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Variables   Publication  Mid-point  (Mid-point)
2 Australia  Canada Cyprus  Finland  France Ireland Japan  N.Z. Norway  Sweden  U.K.  U.S. Level  Ethanol 
Share 
Beer                           
Wine                           
Spirit                           
Marsh.                           
Frisch                           
Hicks.                           
Conditional                           
Unconditional                           
Inferred                           
Cross                           
Linear                           
System                           
Short                           
Long                           
Import                           
Year                           
Quart                           
Daily                           
Publication  1.000                        
Mid-point  .710  1.000                       
(Mid-point)
2  .710  1.000  1.000                     
Australia  .014  -.037  -.038  1.000                    
Canada  -.096  -.051  -.053  -.165  1.000                   
Cyprus  .093  .097 .098  -.044  -.061  1.000                 
Finland  .114  .086 .086  -.085  -.116  -.031  1.000               
France  .101  .094 .095  -.048  -.066  -.018  -.034  1.000              
Ireland  .158  .093 .093  -.054  -.075  -.020  -.038  -.022  1.000             
Japan  .098  .108 .108  -.051  -.071  -.019  -.036  -.020  -.023  1.000           
N.Z.  .091  .027 .026  -.078  -.107  -.029  -.055  -.031  -.035  -.033  1.000         
Norway  .111  .045  .045  -.068  -.094  -.025  -.048  -.027  -.031  -.029 -.044 1.000           
Sweden  .123 .079  .079 -.071  -.098  -.026  -.050  -.028  -.032  -.030  -.046  -.040  1.000        
U.K.  -.162 -.165  -.163 -.214  -.294  -.079  -.151  -.085  -.097  -.091  -.139  -.122  -.126  1.000       
U.S.  -.093 .027  .027 -.149  -.204  -.055  -.105  -.059  -.067  -.064  -.097  -.085  -.088  -.265  1.000     
Level  -.066 -.061  -.061  .106  -.162  .014  -.033  .159  .121  -.068  .032  -.143  -.080  .075  -.025  1.000   
Ethanol Share  -.063 -.054  -.054  .025  -.036  -.003  -.006  .026  -.004  .026  -.006  -.025  -.005  -.007  -.002  .936  1.000 
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